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THE SKEPTIC’S GUIDE TO 
INFORMATION SHARING AT SENTENCING 
 
Ryan W. Scott* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The “information sharing model,” a leading method of structuring judicial 
discretion at the sentencing stage of criminal cases, has attracted broad support from 
scholars and judges.  Under this approach, sentencing judges should have access to a 
robust body of information, including written opinions and statistics, about previous 
sentences in similar cases.  According to proponents, judges armed with that information 
can conform their sentences to those of their colleagues or identify principled reasons for 
distinguishing them, reducing inter-judge disparity and promoting rationality in 
sentencing law. 
This Article takes a skeptical view of the information sharing model, arguing that 
it suffers from three fundamental weaknesses as an alternative to other structured 
sentencing reforms.  First, there are information collection challenges.  To succeed, the 
model requires sentencing information that is written, comprehensive, and representative.  
Due to acute time constraints, however, courts cannot routinely generate that kind of 
information.  Second, there are information dissemination challenges.  Sharing 
sentencing information raises concerns about the privacy of offenders and victims.  Also, 
the volume and complexity of sentencing decisions create practical difficulties in making 
relevant information accessible to sentencing judges.  Third, the model’s voluntariness is 
an important drawback.  The information sharing model rests on the heroic assumption 
that judges will respond to information about previous sentences by dutifully following 
the decisions of their colleagues.  That is unrealistic.  Judges just as easily can disregard 
the information, ignore it, or even move in the opposite direction. 
Despite those grounds for skepticism, information sharing can play a valuable role 
as a supplement to other sentencing reforms.  In particular, information sharing would 
benefit from a system of sentencing guidelines, whether mandatory or advisory, and from 
open access to the information on the part of defense counsel and prosecutors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, prominent scholars and judges in the United States have proposed an 
“information sharing model” for structuring criminal sentencing decisions.  In 
indeterminate sentencing systems, which prevailed throughout the United States until the 
1970s, judges enjoyed broad and essentially unchecked discretion to select the 
appropriate punishment for criminal offenses.  With broad statutory ranges, no appellate 
review, and no obligation to give reasons for their decisions, judges largely were left to 
their own intuitions in choosing a sentence.  One consequence was stark inter-judge 
disparity.  Similarly situated offenders stood to receive widely disparate sentences 
depending on the values, preferences, and biases of the sentencing judge.   Another was 
that no rational and principled body of sentencing law could develop.  To address those 
weaknesses, reformers in the 1970s and 1980s proposed various methods of structuring 
sentencing decisions. 
One leading approach, which I will describe as the information sharing model, has 
attracted strong scholarly support and is experiencing something of a renaissance.  The 
idea is that judges should have access to a robust store of information about previous 
sentences in similar cases.  Armed with statistical data, details about past offenses and 
offenders, and written opinions from similar cases, sentencing judges can achieve better 
results.  Information sharing will promote inter-judge consistency and rationality, the 
argument goes, because judges who understand the reasons for previous sentences can 
conform to them or identify principled points of distinction.  A distinguished and varied 
group of scholars and judges has endorsed some form information sharing at sentencing, 
including Marc Miller,1 Michael Wolff,2 Kate Stith and José Cabranes,3 Nancy Gertner,4 
and Robert Sweet.5 
The information sharing model is frequently advanced as an alternative to more 
intrusive forms of structured sentencing, such as sentencing guidelines.  Already 
“sentencing information systems” and other forms of electronic data sharing form a 
crucial component of the sentencing process in some U.S. states and in jurisdictions 
overseas.  Missouri, for example, has attracted national attention for its “information-
based discretionary sentencing system,” which strives to equip sentencing judges with 
better data about previous outcomes in similar cases.6  And just last year, Ireland’s 
criminal courts launched an ambitious sentencing information system as a national pilot 
                                                 
1 Marc L. Miller, A Map of Sentencing and a Compass for Judges: Sentencing Information Systems, 
Transparency, and the Next Generation of Reform, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1351, 1381 n.95 (2005); Marc 
Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Need for Written Sentencing Opinions, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 3, 20-
21 (1989). 
2 Michael A. Wolff, Missouri’s Information-Based Discretionary Sentencing System, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
95, 101 (2006). 
3 KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
168-77(1998). 
4 Nancy Gertner, Confronting the Costs of Incarceration: Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 261, 279–80 (2009). 
5 Robert W. Sweet et al., Towards a Common Law of Sentencing: Developing Judicial Precedent in 
Cyberspace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 927, 938 (1996). 
6 See Ryan W. Scott, How (Not) To Implement Cost as a Sentencing Factor, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. ____ 
(forthcoming 2012). 
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project.7  Meanwhile, mounting interest in “evidence based” sentencing, using tools like 
risk assessment instruments, has highlighted the need for better information sharing 
infrastructure for sentencing judges.8 
Surprisingly, however, the literature rarely grapples with basic questions about the 
information sharing model.  Is information sharing at sentencing feasible?  Can courts 
and other stakeholders in the criminal justice system effectively collect, disseminate, and 
make use of a large volume of information about criminal sentences?  Can the 
information sharing model achieve its objectives, reducing inter-judge disparity and 
promoting rationality? 
Count me a skeptic.  For structural and practical reasons, voluntary information 
sharing is a poor stand-alone model for promoting consistency and rationality in 
sentencing law.  Despite considerable enthusiasm among scholars and commentators, 
there is little evidence that the information sharing model can serve as an effective 
alternative to other structured sentencing models.  Nonetheless, information sharing can 
operate as a valuable supplement to other reforms, especially sentencing guidelines.  And 
previous experiments with information sharing at sentencing offer important lessons 
about what works.  Think of this Article as a “skeptic’s guide” to the information sharing 
model.  It advances related three sets of claims.   
The first set of claims is conceptual.  Information sharing suffers from 
fundamental weaknesses as a mechanism for promoting inter-judge consistency and 
rationality.  There are daunting information collection obstacles.  To achieve its 
objectives, the information sharing model depends on case-level sentencing information 
that is written, comprehensive with respect to relevant facts, and representative of 
outcomes in similar cases.  But because of the complexity of sentencing decisions, there 
is reason to doubt that sentencing courts can routinely generate that kind of information.  
There are also formidable information sharing obstacles.  Sentencing judges rely on 
highly sensitive personal information about offenders, raising privacy concerns about any 
program of data dissemination.  Also, as a practical matter, it is difficult to make the large 
volume of relevant information available to judges in a useful format.  The voluntariness 
of the information sharing model is also an important drawback.  The model assumes that 
judges will respond to information about earlier sentences by dutifully aligning their 
decisions with others.  That is unrealistic.  Judges can just as easily disregard the 
information, ignore it, or even move in the opposite direction from their colleagues’ 
reasoning, at the expense of inter-judge consistency and rationality. 
The second set of claims is empirical.  To illustrate challenges with information 
collection, this Article contains an original empirical study of data reporting practices 
from a federal district court.  The study analyzes more than 400 “Statement of Reasons” 
documents, which federal judges must complete in connection with every criminal 
sentence.  Because the documents are ordinarily nonpublic, the study is the first of its 
kind in the United States.  The results reveal that, despite mandatory reporting 
requirements, judges rarely provide the kind of written opinions necessary to support an 
effective information sharing model.  In 48.6% of cases in which a written description 
was required, the sentencing judge did not provide one.  Just 6.0% of cases prompted a 
                                                 
7 Carol Coulter, Website on Court Sentencing Launched, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at 4. 
8 See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based Sentencing, 
64 SMU L. REV. 1329 (2011). 
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written explanation of approximately one page of discussion or more.  And the class of 
cases in which the judge provided a lengthy explanation differed in important ways from 
the population of criminal cases as a whole.  The study thus confirms some of the 
challenges that courts face in collecting written, comprehensive, and representative 
sentencing information. 
To illustrate challenges with information sharing and voluntariness, the Article 
discusses two previous experiments with the information sharing model.  Several 
jurisdictions in the United States and in foreign countries have developed “sentencing 
information systems” (SISs), interactive computer systems designed to provide judges 
with statistics and other information about previous sentences in similar cases.  Yet no 
research has shown that SISs contribute to inter-judge consistency and rationality, and 
most systems have atrophied due to judicial neglect.  Similarly, a handful of federal 
district courts in the 1970s experimented with “sentencing councils,” which are voluntary 
meetings of sentencing judges to discuss upcoming cases.  Research revealed, however, 
that the councils failed to reduce inter-judge disparity because the sentencing judge 
retained discretion to disregard the council’s advice.  Today they are all but abandoned. 
The third set of claims is prescriptive.  If the Article’s conceptual and empirical 
claims are sound, then two features of a sentencing system might make information 
sharing more effective in promoting inter-judge consistency and rationality.  First, 
information sharing is more likely to succeed as a supplement to a system of sentencing 
guidelines, rather than a stand-alone mechanism for structuring sentencing discretion.  
That is because guidelines provide a shared vocabulary about sentencing, operationalize 
complex sentencing concepts, and channel the attention of sentencing courts.  Second, 
information sharing would have greater impact if defense counsel and prosecutors enjoy 
open access to the store of sentencing information.  Although open access would 
accentuate privacy concerns, harnessing the adversary process would greatly improve the 
visibility of sentencing information and help guard against errors. 
Thus, although styled as a “skeptic’s guide,” the Article expresses cautious 
optimism about the information sharing model.  A carefully designed information sharing 
system can improve sentencing outcomes.  Nonetheless, it is doubtful that voluntary 
information sharing, standing alone, can meaningfully reduce inter-judge disparity or 
promote rationality in sentencing law.  Information sharing therefore should be 
considered a supplement, not an alternative, to other structured sentencing reforms. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the information sharing model 
and the broad support it has attracted among scholars and judges as a mechanism for 
reducing inter-judge disparity and improving rationality in sentencing outcomes.  It also 
distinguishes the information sharing model from two popular alternatives:  the “common 
law” model the “sentencing guidelines” model. 
Part II develops the Article’s conceptual claims, describing the formidable 
obstacles an information sharing model will face.  Information collection will be difficult 
because the model depends on case-level information that is written, comprehensive, and 
representative.  Information sharing will raise legal concerns about offender privacy and 
practical concerns about the usefulness of statistics and case information.  Voluntariness 
also can undermine the information sharing model by leaving judges free to ignore or 
repudiate the reasoning of their colleagues.  
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Part III develops the Article’s empirical claims.  It first reports the results of the 
empirical study, illustrating the challenges in collecting information using unique data 
from sentencing documents in a federal district court.  It then discusses two analogous 
reform efforts, sentencing information systems and sentencing councils, and the mostly 
discouraging research concerning their effectiveness. 
Part IV develops the Article’s prescriptive claims.  It contends that the 
information sharing model would be more effective as a supplement, not an alternative, 
to other reform efforts.  In particular, it contends a system of sentencing guidelines and 
open access to sentencing information would improve the chances of success. 
I.   THE INFORMATION SHARING MODEL 
Among scholars and judges, one frequently discussed method of structuring 
sentencing decisions is the robust exchange of information among sentencing judges.  
That approach—call it the “information sharing model”—differs from alternative 
structured sentencing reforms, such as sentencing guidelines or a judge-made common 
law of sentencing.  Yet proponents believe that it can accomplish many of the same 
goals, reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity and promoting rationality in sentencing 
law. 
A.   Two Key Objectives of Sentencing Reform 
In “indeterminate” sentencing systems, which prevailed in almost all U.S. 
jurisdictions until the 1970s, judges enjoyed essentially unfettered discretion in choosing 
the type and severity of sentences.9  Grounded in the once-dominant theory that 
rehabilitation was the principal goal of criminal punishment, indeterminate sentencing 
sought to maximize judges’ ability to “individualize” sentences and thereby help 
offenders to become productive members of society.10  Legislatures, in defining criminal 
offenses, often authorized a wide range of punishments.  For a single violation, for 
example, the court might have the option of imposing a fine, or a period of probation, or a 
term of imprisonment ranging anywhere from a few days to many years.11  Few 
jurisdictions provided any rules or guidance about how to select an appropriate 
punishment.  The decision of the sentencing court was essentially unchallengeable, with 
no right to appeal.12  In fact, judges had no obligation even to give reasons for the 
sentence selected.13  By design, this “black box” gave judges enormous discretion to 
tailor sentences to the needs of criminals. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, indeterminate sentencing came under sustained 
criticism by scholars and policymakers, and in the last 30 years criminal sentencing has 
undergone radical transformation.  Calls for structured sentencing addressed a wide range 
of concerns, including dissatisfaction with the rehabilitative ideal and a desire for “truth 
                                                 
9 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 9-11. 
10 Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 389 (2006); see United States v. 
Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.) (judges were expected to choose 
sentences “almost like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical judgment”). 
11 E.g. Bank Robbery Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-235, 48 Stat. 783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113 (2006)) 
12 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 9 & 197 n.3. 
13 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 542, 543 (Michael Tonry 
ed., 1998). 
 5 
in sentencing” undermined by parole.  But two central claims of sentencing reformers are 
particularly relevant here. 
First, indeterminate sentencing produced unacceptable levels of inter-judge 
sentencing disparity.14  Vested with enormous discretion and subject to little oversight, 
judges were largely left to their own intuitions in selecting an appropriate sentence.  As a 
result, the preferences, philosophy, and biases of the judge played an important role in 
determining the sentence.  Similarly situated offenders, convicted of similar crimes, could 
receive starkly different sentences depending on which judge was assigned to the case.15  
Reformers argued that inter-judge disparity offends fundamental rule-of-law values such 
as equality, objectivity, and consistency.16  For those reasons, inter-judge disparity also 
harms the reputation of the courts.17  In addition, inter-judge disparity potentially 
undermines the deterrent effect of criminal law by making punishment less certain and 
predictable.18  Hoping to achieve greater consistency between judges, Congress identified 
the reduction of inter-judge disparity as its primary goal in the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.19  Many state legislatures have followed suit.20 
Second, indeterminate sentencing resulted in irrational sentencing law.  With 
sentences overwhelmingly unexplained and unreviewable, neither courts nor legislatures 
had developed well-reasoned, intelligible, and principled sentencing law.  Reformers 
hoped to develop a more rational system in which sentencing courts would thoughtfully 
develop a body of coherent sentencing rules and principles.  Congress cited improved 
“rationality” in sentencing decisions as an anticipated and desired benefit of the 
                                                 
14 The term “sentencing disparity” requires clarification, because it is essentially meaningless standing 
alone.  Many “disparities,” or differences, between sentences are entirely justified based on legitimate 
differences between offenses and offenders.  Whether particular differences between sentences are justified 
is contestable, and depends on some underlying theory of punishment.  See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of 
Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 (1997).  Throughout this Article I refer to “inter-judge 
disparity,” by which I mean differences in sentences driven not by differences in offense or offender 
characteristics, but by the preferences, personality, and biases of the sentencing judge.  See also Ryan W. 
Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6 n.23 (2010). 
15 See Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 274 (1977) (describing the 
evidence of serious inter-judge sentencing disparity as “overwhelming”); ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & 
WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE 
JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 36 (1974); Kevin Clancy et al., Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of 
Sentence Decisions and the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524, 
525-26 (1981). 
16 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5, 10 (1973); Elyce H. Zenoff, 
Sentencing Disparity, at 1449, 1450, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (Sanford H. Kadish, ed. 
1983). 
17 Memorandum from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Office of Policy & Legislation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to Hon. William K. Sessions III, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2 (June 28, 2010), available at 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/annual_letter_2010_final_062810.pdf 
18 Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The 
First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 237 (1989). 
19 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 45 (1983) (“Sentencing disparities that are not justified by differences 
among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the public.”); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, at 1.2 (1987); Stephen Breyer, The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988). 
20 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann., § 244 app. § I; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101. 
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.21  Many states too have identified rationality as a key 
goal of sentencing reform.22 
To be sure, there is lively debate among scholars about whether inter-judge 
consistency and rationality in sentencing ought to be high-priority goals.23  Excessive 
concern about sentencing “disparity,” for example, may distract attention from other 
important goals in designing a just sentencing system.24  Rather than attempt to resolve 
that debate, however, this Article accepts for the sake of argument that inter-judge 
consistency and rationality are desirable.  Not only is that premise enshrined in law in 
many jurisdictions,25 but structured sentencing reforms are often advertised as a way of 
achieving those objectives.26  It is fair to ask whether they can deliver on their promises. 
To reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, reformers have proposed 
a variety of structured sentencing models.  One prominent model is a system of 
sentencing guidelines.  Although there is considerable variety in guidelines systems, 
sentencing guidelines generally consist of detailed rules promulgated by an independent 
sentencing commission.27  At sentencing, the judge is required to make factual findings 
about the offense conduct, the effect on victims, and the offender’s criminal history and 
personal characteristics.  Based on those factors, the guidelines specify a sentence or 
sentencing range (such as 63-72 months of imprisonment).  In some systems, the range is 
“mandatory” or “presumptive,” binding judges to impose a sentence within the guideline 
range except in unusual circumstances.28   In others, including federal system, the 
guideline range is “advisory” and thus allows a greater degree of flexibility and 
discretion.  But the judge nonetheless must make the required findings, accurately 
calculate the guideline range, and give due consideration to that range when selecting a 
sentence.29 
Another model with broad support among scholars is a “common law of 
sentencing.”  In the common-law model, sentencing decisions are subject to review by 
appellate courts and may be reversed or altered.  Although there is considerable variety in 
how the common law may operate—the appellate courts’ power to vacate or revise, the 
standard of review, the prevalence of “guideline judgments”—the essential feature of a 
common law of sentencing is the regulation of sentencing judges by other courts in the 
                                                 
21 S. Rep. No. 225, at 120 (1983) (stating that sentencing reforms are intended to provide “enough guidance 
and control of the exercise of [sentencing] discretion to promote fairness and rationality . . . in 
sentencing.”). 
22 E.g. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101 (directing the sentencing commission to “establish rational and 
consistent sentencing standards”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2153(a) (similar). 
23 Kate Stith and José Cabranes, in particular, disavow those objectives as driving purposes of their 
proposed reforms.  STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 172-73 (emphasis removed). 
24 See, e.g., id. at 106, 121-24 (calling the reduction of inter-judge disparity “a worthwhile goal for 
sentencing reform,” but also a “complex goal” that should not be the “myopic focus”); Kevin Cole, The 
Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1337 (1997); Albert Alschuler, The Failure 
of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901 (1991). 
25 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 58-62, 63-65 and accompanying text. 
27 Richard F. Sparks, Sentencing Guidelines, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1457, at 1458 
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). 
28 Sentencing guidelines in Minnesota, Washington, and Kansas fit that description. 
29 For example, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines operate in that manner following United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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judicial hierarchy.  As described by Kevin Reitz, the powers of appellate courts in the 
common-law model include “determinations of the eligible goals of punishment 
decisions, and the creation of legal doctrine that translates those objectives into rules of 
decision.”30  Like other bodies of common law, a common law of sentencing evolves 
incrementally as appellate courts announce rules, carve out exceptions, draw distinctions, 
and occasionally overrule their prior decisions.  But it culminates in a body of binding 
precedent, and sentencing judges must impose a sentence in conformity with that case 
law or risk reversal on appeal. 
B.   The Information Sharing Model in Action 
Another leading model for structuring sentencing discretion is the information 
sharing model.  A host of prominent judges and scholars has endorsed some form of 
information sharing as a way to structure judicial discretion in criminal sentencing.31  
Under this approach, when imposing sentence, judges should have access to a store of 
information—statistics, written opinions, and other case information—about previous 
outcomes in similar cases.32  Marc Miller has long urged more thorough judicial opinion 
writing and data dissemination to facilitate the development of coherent and principled 
sentencing law.33  He has also written extensively on “sentencing information systems,” 
searchable databases of sentencing data, as a possible “reform” for broken structured 
sentencing regimes.34  Justice Michael Wolff has extolled the advantages of an 
“information-based discretionary sentencing system” whose centerpiece is voluntary 
information sharing to assist sentencing judges.35  Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes, in 
their influential work criticizing the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, have argued that the 
“basic model” for regulating sentencing discretion should be guidance from other judges 
through written opinions and data about previous cases.36  Judge Nancy Gertner has 
proposed extensive information sharing among sentencing judges at the federal level, 
urging federal judges to consult sentencing statistics and written opinions as a way to 
“make better sentencing decisions in each individual case.”37  Similarly, Judge Robert 
Sweet has proposed that judges should have access to a store of written opinions and 
statistics—a combination of “common law principles and modern technology”—that 
                                                 
30 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and 
State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1454 (1997). 
31 Eric Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 
102 (2005) (describing the information sharing approach as “embraced by many scholars and jurists”). 
32 Id. (describing a model in which “today’s courts draw[] upon the analysis and conclusions of prior 
judicial opinions”).  Luna describes this model as a “common law of sentencing.”  In this Article, I reserve 
the term “common law” for a system of binding precedent developed by the courts, rather than one 
grounded in voluntary information sharing.  See infra note 30 and accompanying text. 
33 Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
34 Marc Miller, Sentencing Reform “Reform” Through Sentencing Information Systems, in THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT (Michael Tonry ed. 2004) at 121. 
35 Wolff, supra note 2, at 95. 
36 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 170-71, 176. 
37 Gertner, supra note 4, at 277. 
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would improve sentencing decisions.38  J.C. Oleson, among others, has endorsed 
sentencing information systems as a method of facilitating evidence-based sentencing.39   
Recently, the information sharing model has attracted high-profile attention 
among policymakers.  In February 2012, testifying before the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission about the future of the federal sentencing guidelines, representatives of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States stressed the crucial role of information sharing 
for sentencing judges.40  As Judge Paul Barbadoro explained, judges “appreciate 
knowing whether their sentences are in step with other sentences by other judges for 
similar cases,” and they need a sentencing system that provides that kind of 
information.41  In September 2010, the State of Missouri, which has explicitly embraced 
the information sharing model, made national headlines for its efforts to shape sentencing 
outcomes by giving judges access to more information about punishment costs.42  
Overseas, in August 2010, the criminal courts of Ireland launched a web site designed to 
share information about sentencing outcomes, the product of an ambitious four-year 
effort to coordinate the actions of sentencing judges.43   
A real-world example can illustrate the operation of the information sharing 
model.  In Missouri, the state legislature and courts have chosen information sharing as 
the principal method of regulating sentencing discretion.  Missouri sentencing law in 
some ways resembles a traditional indeterminate system:  within broad statutory ranges 
specified by the legislature, judges are free to impose any sentence.44  No appellate 
review of sentences is available, except to the extent that a sentence falls outside the 
statutory range.45  Neither the legislature nor a sentencing commission provides guidance 
to judges about eligible purposes of punishment, or about factors to consider at 
sentencing.46  And nothing in state law requires that judges issue written opinions—or 
                                                 
38 Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 938. 
39 Oleson, supra note 8, at 1341-42; J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the 
Twenty-Fifth Birthday of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 744 (2011); see also 
Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk Assessments and 
Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQUESNE L. REV. 707, 728 (2011). 
40 Testimony of Judge Paul J. Barbadoro before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Feb. 16, 2012, at 9-10 & 
n.27, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20120215-
16/Testimony_16_Barbadoro.pdf. 
41 Id. at 9; see also id. at 9 n.27 (quoting Judge Richard Arcara’s testimony that it is “crucial” for judges to 
have “information about how the sentence that we are considering compares overall with sentences 
recommended for this type of conduct”); id. at 10 n.27 (quoting Judge Jon McCalla’s testimony that 
“historical data” on sentencing is “greatly valued” and necessary to allow judges to “to make the difficult 
decisions required in sentencing on a consistent basis”). 
42 See, e.g., Monica Davey, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2010; Deniz 
Koray, New sentencing matrix shows Missouri judges the cost of prison, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN, Sept. 29, 
2010; Heather Ratcliffe, Missouri judges get penalty cost before sentencing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Sept. 14, 2010. 
43 Carol Coulter, Website on Court Sentencing Launched, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at 4. 
44 Scott, supra note 6, at __. 
45 See State v. Cook, 440 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Mo. 1969). 
46 Wolff, supra note 2, at 97 (because “[t]here is no overt guidance in Missouri law as to the purposes for 
punishment,” judges must “approach sentencing pragmatically and, to a degree, subjectively”). 
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even statements in open court—giving reasons for the sentence imposed.47  By design, 
“[j]udicial discretion is the cornerstone of sentencing in Missouri courts.”48   
Yet Missouri strives to lend structure to sentencing decisions by insisting upon 
“fully informed discretion.”49  The Missouri Sentencing Advisory Commission (MSAC), 
charged by the legislature to make recommendations about sentencing,50 has created an 
interactive web site to share sentencing information.51  Using the web site, judges and 
lawyers can fill out a form that captures key offense and offender characteristics.  Based 
on that information, the system reports recommended, aggravated, and mitigated 
sentencing options.52  The recommendations do not reflect the Commission’s own 
judgments, but “reflect sentencing practices of Missouri’s judges” based on years of 
historical data.53  The idea is that judges should have access to accurate and up-to-date 
information about what their colleagues have done in cases that share those 
characteristics.  Importantly, the information is provided on a “purely voluntary” basis.54  
Judges have no obligation to take the information into account, or even look it up.  But 
the MSAC believes that, by providing useful information, it can win the “hearts and 
minds” of judges and persuade them to follow its recommendations.55  It is the perfect 
strategy for the “show me” state:   Show judges the information, then leave them alone. 
As the Missouri example makes clear, the information sharing model differs 
sharply from other forms of structured sentencing, like sentencing guidelines or a 
common law of sentencing.  It is intended to assist sentencing judges, rather than 
constrain them.56  Information is generated by the judiciary for its own benefit, not 
imposed by an external regulatory body like a sentencing commission.  The information 
sharing model does not depend on legal rules that block judges from selecting sentences 
outside a specified range (as in a mandatory guidelines systems) or in conflict with 
binding precedent (as in a common-law system).  To the contrary, judges retain 
essentially the same wide discretion present in an indeterminate sentencing regime.  Nor 
does the information sharing model compel judges to make any specific determinations 
or to focus on particular factors (as in an advisory guidelines system).  Instead, the 
information sharing model insists, in Judge Gertner’s words, that “judges need to see 
what other judges are doing.”57  The information sharing model arms judges with better 
                                                 
47 See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.019; Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.07(b) (requiring only that the court “pronounce [the] 
sentence”). 
48 MISSOURI SENTENCING ADVISORY COMMISSION, RECOMMENDED SENTENCING: REPORT AND 
IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE 11-13 (2005). 
49 Wolff, supra note 2, at 97; MISSOURI SENTENCING ADVISORY COMMISSION, RECOMMENDED 
SENTENCING: REPORT AND IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE 11-13 (2005), available at http:// 
www.mosac.mo.gov. 
50 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.019.6(3). 
51 Michael Wolff, Missouri Provides Cost of Sentences and Recidivism Data: What Does Cost Have to Do 
with Justice?, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. ____ (2012). 
52 Id. 
53 Wolff, supra note 2, at 98. 
54 MSAC, supra note 49. 
55 Wolff, supra note 2, at 97-98, 101. 
56 Wolff, supra note 2, at 98 (Missouri system is designed to “help” actors in the system to “focus on shared 
information” about offenses and offenders). 
57 Gertner, supra note 4, at 278-79. 
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information, but leaves them free to consult and consider that information strictly on a 
voluntary basis.   
Proponents of the information sharing model contend that it can accomplish the 
same goals as other structured sentencing reforms.  Information sharing will reduce inter-
judge disparity, the argument goes, because disparity between judges principally results 
from a lack of information about what other judges have done in similar cases.58  Closing 
the “information gap” will thus close the “disparity gap.”  Judge Robert Sweet has 
predicted that an information sharing model based on written opinions and sentencing 
statistics “would provide, almost automatically, a firmament of reference points and a 
body of reasoning developed by the courts,” thereby  “alleviating unwarranted disparity” 
between judges.59  Similarly, Judge Gertner argues that making sentencing opinions 
available to other judges is “critical” to “cabining discretion” because “[i]n order to avoid 
inter-judge disparities, judges must be able to see the decisions made in the courtroom 
next door.”60  Noting that judges frequently agree about the ordinal ranking of offense 
severity, even when they disagree about the cardinal severity of sentences, Stith and 
Cabranes predict that simply requiring written sentencing opinions and disseminating 
sentencing data—to serve as “quantitative guideposts to judges”—will reduce inter-judge 
disparity.61  In recommending Missouri’s approach, Justice Wolff remains “hope[ful]” 
that voluntary information sharing will “eliminate some of these overall disparities and 
gross differences.”62   
In addition, proponents argue, the information sharing model will produce more 
rational sentencing law.  For one thing, the process of exchanging information will 
encourage more thoughtful decisions.  Robust exchange of information, Judge Gertner 
explains, would encourage judges “to give coherent explanations, to articulate rules of 
general application” as part of a continuing dialogue among sentencing courts.63  
Prompting judges to “think through” every sentence, and to explain their reasons for the 
benefit of their colleagues, will improve the quality of the resulting decisions.64  At the 
same time, information sharing at sentencing would encourage more principled decisions.  
For Judge Sweet, an important advantage of a robust store of information about previous 
                                                 
58 Cf. Zenoff, supra note 16, at 1451 (“[Some] observers believe that sentencing disparity would virtually 
disappear if judges had access to data about their colleagues’ decisions.”).  
59 Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 943, 946. 
60 Gertner, supra note 4, at 279. 
61 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 176; Sara Beth Lewis, Review: Fear of Judging, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 
901, 912 (1999) (discussing Stith and Cabranes’s proposal “that requiring a reviewable written sentencing 
order would have sufficiently reduced the amount of unwarranted disparity”).  See also, e.g., Jelani 
Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological Case Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines to Stay the Same in Light of Gall, Kimbrough, and New Understandings of Reasonableness 
Review, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 148–49 (2008); Christina N. Davilas, Note, Prosecutorial Sentence 
Appeals: Reviving the Forgotten Doctrine in State Law as an Alternative to Mandatory Sentencing Laws, 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1283 (2002) (sentencing statistics “could assist both trial judges devising 
sentences and appellate judges reviewing those sentences, thereby reducing disparity”). 
62 Wolff, supra note 2, at 118. 
63 Judge Nancy Gertner, Thoughts on Reasonableness, 19 FED. SENT’G RPTR. 165, 166 (2007). 
64 See Berman, supra note 3, at 104 (arguing that “[t]he process of articulating rationales for their decisions 
enables judges,” as part of a “common-law dialogue about sentencing policy and practice,” to “develop a 
principled jurisprudence of sentencing”). 
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cases is that it will produce a “coherent and ever-adapting body of law” that helps to 
intelligently translate “broad sentencing policies to individual cases.”65 
Importantly, information sharing is not mutually exclusive with other reform 
efforts, like sentencing guidelines or a common-law model.  Indeed, many scholars 
endorse some combination of approaches.  Stith and Cabranes, Judge Sweet, and others 
endorse information sharing as a supplement to a judge-made “common law of 
sentencing.”66  Judge Gertner and the Judicial Conference of the United States seek to 
promote information sharing in the federal system to support a system of advisory 
sentencing guidelines.67  They reason that, even in jurisdictions with more formal or 
intrusive structured sentencing programs, information sharing can serve a valuable 
function.  Sentencing law should assist judges, even as it constrains them. 
Nonetheless, for several reasons, it is useful to disentangle the information 
sharing model from other approaches.  First, some jurisdictions (including Missouri and 
Ireland) have adopted what might be called a “pure” information sharing model, in which 
the sole mechanism for structuring sentencing decisions is a program of formal 
information sharing.  An assessment of information sharing at sentencing is of crucial 
relevance to legislators, judges, and other stakeholders in those systems. 
Second, proponents of the information sharing model frequently recommend it as 
an alternative to more intrusive reforms, especially sentencing guidelines.  In Missouri, 
the MSAC describes its information-based discretionary system as the product of a 
conscious choice between two models:  information sharing, designed to assist judges 
and to win their approval; and a “regulatory,” “rule-driven system” of sentencing 
guidelines that can hope to command merely “obedience.”68  In Ireland, the information 
sharing model was advertised and embraced as a way “to avoid the proliferation of 
mandatory sentences with all their flaws.”69  The same scenario has played out in other 
jurisdictions, with the information sharing model positioned as a direct competitor to 
alternative reforms like sentencing guidelines.70 
Third, the information sharing model deserves separate attention because it 
fundamentally differs from “command and control” reforms like sentencing guidelines 
and judge-made common law.  It rests on different assumptions about how legislators and 
sentencing commissions can influence judges, and faces different challenges in shaping 
sentencing outcomes.  Whether as a stand-alone system or as a supplement to more 
elaborate regulations, the information sharing model is designed to perform a distinct 
function, worthy of separate consideration. 
                                                 
65 Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 945.  
66 See, e.g., STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 170-72; Sweet et al., supra note 17, at 928; Reitz, supra 
note 30, at 1454. 
67 Gertner, supra note 7, at 279–80; Barbadoro, supra note 40, at 9-10. 
68 Wolff, supra note 2, at 100-01. 
69 Tom O’Malley, Creativity and Principled Discretion over Sentencing a Necessity, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 19, 
2011, at 20. 
70 See Neil Hutton, A Sentencing Exception? Changing Sentencing Policy in Scotland, 22 FED. SENT’G 
RPTR. 272, 275 (2010) (describing how judges in Scotland proposed information sharing at sentencing as a 
defensive measure, hoping to ward off calls for more intrusive regulation). 
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II.  FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESSES OF THE INFORMATION SHARING MODEL 
There is reason for skepticism that information sharing can meaningfully reduce 
inter-judge disparity and promote rationality in sentencing law.  Conceptually, the 
information sharing model suffers from three fundamental weaknesses.  First, there are 
challenges in collecting sentencing information.  To succeed, the information sharing 
model depends on written, comprehensive, and representative information about 
sentencing practices, but as a practical matter that information is difficult to assemble.  
Second, there are challenges in disseminating sentencing information.  Privacy concerns 
on the part of offenders, coupled with challenges in making the information accessible 
and useful for judges, arise even if extensive information is available.  Third, 
voluntariness presents serious challenges.  By ignoring or disregarding information about 
how their colleagues have handled similar cases, judges can exacerbate inter-judge 
disparity and undermine rationality. 
Before reviewing the empirical evidence and possible strategies for overcoming 
them, a description of each set of challenges is in order. 
A.   Information Collection Challenges 
The most daunting challenge to the information sharing model is collecting 
sufficient information about the reasoning and results of past sentencing decisions.  To 
succeed, the information sharing model requires a store of information about previous 
cases—for example, written opinions, offense and offender data, or aggregate statistics—
made available to judges at sentencing.  But two characteristics of sentencing decisions 
make information sharing particularly difficult in this context. 
One is volume.  Courts in the United States impose a staggering number of 
criminal sentences each year.  Because plea bargaining has become the dominant method 
of adjudicating guilt or innocence, only a tiny fraction of cases end in trial.71  Roughly 
two-thirds of criminal cases, however, end in a guilty plea, conviction, and sentence.72  In 
state systems, each year more than 1.07 million adults receive a sentence for a felony 
conviction.73  In the federal system, more than 81,000 criminal sentences are imposed 
annually.74  Those overall figures also mask considerable variability in volume between 
jurisdictions and courtrooms.  In some state courts, judges may impose 50 sentences per 
week, or more than 2,000 per year.75 
The other is complexity.  Sentencing decisions typically require that judges 
consider a startling number of factors.  Under a typical sentencing statute, the judge must 
take into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding both the offense and the 
                                                 
71 BRIAN J. OSTRUM ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS, 2002: A NATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 53-86 (2003) (noting that just 3% of criminal cases in 
state courts nationwide are resolved at trial). 
72 Id. (nationally 65% of cases result in a guilty plea, and most trials result in a conviction). 
73 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004 (July 2007), at 1 
(estimating that 1,079,000 adults were convicted of felonies and sentenced in state courts in 2004), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf. 
74 U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS 2009, Table 1 (2010). 
75 Who Killed Vincent Chin? (Filmmakers Library 1988), tr. at 14 (quoting Wayne County, Michigan 
Circuit Court Judge Charles Kaufman), quoted in Paula C. Johnson, The Social Construction of Identity in 
Criminal Cases, 1 MICH. J. RACE & LAW 347, 456 (1996). 
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personal characteristics of the offender.76  The offense may be limited to a single 
incident, or it may involve a sprawling series of actions over many years.  The judge must 
consider the offender’s acts, omissions, and state of mind, as well as the harm caused by 
the crime.  Considering the offender’s personal characteristics requires a review of the 
offender’s entire life, before and after the offense.  The number of moving parts is 
staggering:  criminal history, assistance to the government, educational background, 
employment history, mental health, good deeds, public service, drug and alcohol 
addiction, childhood opportunities, family life, prospects for treatment, actions in pretrial 
detention, and on and on.  In the words of one federal probation officer, at sentencing a 
judge must consider “a narrative of the individual from the day of his birth to the moment 
of his conviction.”77  And the inquiry does not end with the defendant, since the court 
also may consider how the sentence would affect the offender’s family, the victims, and 
the victims’ families.78 
Compounding the complexity, sentencing judges must consider those facts in 
light of a wide range of purposes of punishment, which may be in tension with one 
another.  Most jurisdictions in the United States have a “laundry list” statute that directs 
sentencing judges to take into account retribution, general and specific deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and various and sundry other goals, without assigning 
priority to any of them.79  In many corners of legal doctrine, judges and lawyers complain 
about the hopeless imprecision of “multi-factor balancing tests.”  Think of sentencing as 
the ultimate example:  a test with an infinite number of factors and no instructions about 
how to balance them. 
Those features of sentencing decisions make it difficult to generate the kind of 
robust store of information required to support the information sharing model.  
Specifically, to reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, the information 
made available to judges must consist of (1) written information, (2) comprehensive with 
respect to material facts, and (3) representative of other sentences in similar cases.  On 
each score there is reason for skepticism. 
1.  Written Information About Sentences 
Initially, the information sharing model depends on sentencing information that is 
written.  It is not enough that judges identify relevant facts, formulate reasons, choose a 
sentence, and then enter judgment.  Those facts and reasons must be reduced to writing, 
and collected in some central store of information, if future courts hope to rely upon them 
for guidance.80 
                                                 
76 E.g. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
77 Garry Sturgis, U.S. v. Barry: They’ve Only Just Begun, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 20, 1990, at 1 (quoting 
Arthur Carrington of the Probation Office in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia); see also 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, PROBATION DIVISION, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION 
REPORT 1 (2d ed. 1984) (presentence reports are designed, among other things, to“help[] the reader 
understand the world in which the defendant lives”). 
78 See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(2)(B) (requiring that presentence reports include information about the 
financial, social, psychological, and medical impact of the offense on victims). 
79 E.g. id. § 3553(a); Model Penal Code § 1.02(2) (1962); KEVIN REITZ, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
1, 71 (2003) (describing the “multiple choice” approach adopted by statute in most states). 
80 Gertner, supra note 4, at 278. 
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At a minimum, that means a lot of data entry.  For each case, someone would 
need to record information about the case, perhaps working from a long checklist of 
relevant offense and offender characteristics.  Given the complexity of sentencing 
decisions, the amount of information collected in each case could be enormous, and the 
process correspondingly costly.  In the federal system, for example, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission employs around 30 full-time staff to review sentencing documents and 
perform data entry,81 and many states handle a much higher volume of criminal cases. 
The deeper problem, however, is that the information sharing model requires 
more than raw data.  A checklist of facts, standing alone, is a poor substitute for a written 
sentencing opinion because it does not disclose the judge’s reasoning.  Although it may 
suggest possibilities, documenting potential aggravating or mitigating factors, it captures 
neither the factors the judge deems most relevant nor the judge’s process of prioritizing 
and balancing them.  Leaving future judges to guess about the rationale for the sentence 
would not improve the rationality of sentencing outcomes.  The information sharing 
model strives to foster a thoughtful and continuing dialogue in which judges discern the 
basis for previous sentences, and then either accept that reasoning or draw principled 
distinctions.  Such a dialogue is impossible without some written account of the judge’s 
reasoning.  Thus, as proponents readily acknowledge, written opinions are the lifeblood 
of the information sharing approach. 82 
There is reason to doubt, however, that sentencing courts can generate enough 
written opinions to support effective information sharing.  For years, scholars have been 
urging sentencing judges to issue full-fledged published sentencing decisions more 
frequently.83  Yet the overwhelming majority of sentencing decisions in the United States 
remain unpublished—indeed, never written down.84   
Typically, rather than prepare a written explanation, the judge announces the 
reasons for the sentence in open court.  Although many sentencing hearings are audio-
recorded, most are not transcribed because they are never needed.85  And even if a written 
transcript is prepared, only a fraction of those transcripts ever become public or otherwise 
available to other judges in future cases.86 
Hearing transcripts, moreover, do a poor job of capturing the judge’s reasoning.  
Statements in open court are primarily directed at the offender, lawyers, witnesses, and 
                                                 
81 Interview with Paul Hofer, the Commission’s former Director of Special Projects, June 2009. 
82 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 170; see also Gertner, supra note 4, at 279 (“Wider use and 
availability of formal sentencing opinions is therefore critical . . . .”) 
83 See, e.g., Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 940; Steven L. Chanenson, Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET 
PART 146, 147 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/images/pdfs/1.pdf; Lynn Adelman & Don Deitrich, 
Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54-55 (2007). 
84 See Uri J. Schild, Statistical Information Systems for Sentencing: A Cookbook, 6 INT’L J. L. INFO. TECH. 
125, 131 (1998) (noting that “published law reports” contain detailed descriptions of only a tiny fraction of 
all sentences).  By law judges in the United States generally have no obligation to produce a written 
sentencing opinion, even if they must state the reasons for the sentence in court.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(c). 
85 Transcription of sentencing hearings, like other proceedings, is not free.  Because the government pays 
such litigation costs both for the prosecution and for indigent offenders, transcripts generally are not 
prepared unless needed in subsequent proceedings, such as an appeal. 
86 See Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 940. 
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observers in the courtroom—not future judges.87  Often cluttered with irrelevant material, 
jarred by interruptions, and disorganized, a sentencing transcript is a poor substitute for a 
written opinion explaining the reasons for a sentence.88 
The vanishingly small rate of written sentencing opinions is not the product of 
laziness or obstinacy.  District court judges operate under acute time constraints.  As 
Frank Bowman has observed in another context, “[t]he coin of the realm, the scarcest 
resource, in federal district court is time,” and many judges understandably “begrudge the 
time it takes to deal with sentencing issues.”89  The sheer volume of sentencing decisions 
forces judges to forego a written opinion in most cases. 
2.  Comprehensive Information About Sentences 
Second, to accomplish its goals, the information sharing model depends on 
sentencing information that is comprehensive.  A written opinion or other record of a case 
must capture the full range of potentially relevant facts and factors—including, crucially, 
those that the judge does not find especially salient.  Otherwise future judges cannot 
reliably compare new cases to previously decided cases. 
To illustrate the need for comprehensive information, suppose that two judges 
impose sentence in identical burglary cases.  Both offenders violently broke into a private 
residence at night, armed with a loaded handgun, and stole personal property worth 
$5,000 before being confronted by the terrified homeowner.  Both offenders also pleaded 
guilty, expressed remorse, have identical criminal histories consisting of a single petty 
juvenile conviction five years ago, and enjoy strong support from loving families.   
The first judge imposes a sentence of two years of probation.  In a written 
opinion, the judge explains that there is no need for a prison sentence in light of the 
offender’s spotless criminal record, prospects for rehabilitation, and low risk of 
recidivism.  But the opinion is not comprehensive.  It notes the dollar amount of the theft, 
but does not specifically mention the handgun or the fact that the homeowner confronted 
the burglar. 
The second judge reads the written opinion and mistakenly believes that the cases 
are very different.  The second judge imposes a sentence of three years of imprisonment.  
Unlike the first case, the judge reasons, this case involved an in-person confrontation 
with a homeowner startled by a burglar in the middle of the night.  That encounter, along 
with the loaded handgun, made this offense much more dangerous and the offender more 
culpable.  Those factors, in the second judge’s view, outweigh the others. 
The result is stark inter-judge disparity, although the judges did not realize it.  
Even though the offenses and offenders were in fact identical, the second judge received 
incomplete—and therefore misleading—information about the earlier case.  Without 
                                                 
87 For excellent commentary on the task of the judge in announcing a sentence in open court, see D. Brock 
Hornby, Speaking in Sentences, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 147 (2011). 
88 Indeed, from time to time appellate courts vacate a sentence and remand the case, not because the 
sentence is necessarily unlawful, but because the sentencing transcript provides an insufficient explanation 
of the decision. 
89 Frank O. Bowman, III, Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
44 ST. LOUIS L.J. 299, 356 (2000). 
 16 
comprehensive written opinions, capturing even factors the judge deems relatively 
unimportant, the information sharing model can malfunction.90 
Unfortunately, there is reason to doubt that comprehensive sentencing information 
can be routinely captured.  Every criminal sentence involves a slate of aggravating factors 
and a slate of mitigating factors.  The task of the sentencing judge is to weigh those 
competing considerations and strike an appropriate balance.91  Written opinions, 
however, rarely disclose and detail all potentially relevant factors.  They are designed, 
after all, not merely to announce the sentence but also to persuade the reader that the 
sentence is reasonable.  Judges naturally focus on the facts and factors they find most 
persuasive while downplaying others.92 
Time constraints exacerbate the problem.  Even a judge committed to writing a 
comprehensive opinion would find the task time-consuming.  The complexity of 
sentencing decisions, which require a wide-open inquiry into dozens of competing 
considerations, makes it difficult to predict, disclose, and discuss all factors that future 
judges might find relevant.  Judges cannot undertake that effort often. 
The review structure of sentencing decisions also makes it tempting to write an 
abbreviated opinion.  In any given case, there is little risk that the judgment will be 
questioned because no other district court judge reviews the case or writes a dissent.93  
Although appellate review of sentences is available in most jurisdictions, criminal 
defendants frequently waive the right to appeal,94 and in any event the chances of a 
successful appeal are very low.95 
Moreover, when judges anticipate that the parties may appeal from a sentence, 
they have strategic incentives to provide fewer details.  Judges do not like to be reversed 
on appeal,96 and detailed sentencing opinions sometimes increase the risk of reversal.  An 
appellate court might be forced to vacate and remand based on a stray reference to a 
prohibited factor, or a misstatement of a relatively minor fact, or an inartful phrase that 
sounds too much like a legal error.   Outside of especially complex or controversial cases, 
writing a long opinion is asking for trouble.  A simple announcement from the bench or a 
terse written order gives the parties little to go on, and therefore little to attack. 
                                                 
90 Austin Lovegrove has made a similar observation in evaluating the Scottish Sentencing Information 
System.  See Austin Lovegrove, Statistical Information Systems as a Means to Consistency and Rationality 
in Sentencing, 7 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 31, 39-40 (1999). 
91 Schild, supra note 84, at 125 (“Sentencing consists in trying to reconcile a number of totally 
irreconcilable facts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92 Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 94 
(2008) (advising lawyers, in drafting a brief, to persuade the reader by “putting some facts in high relief 
and some in low relief—and . . . omitting others altogether”). 
93 Cf. John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMM. 69, 104-05 
(2008) (arguing that judges are less susceptible to confirmation bias than legislators because “[i]f a judge 
ignores facts in the majority opinion, he will suffer the embarrassment of a strong dissenter (a factual 
‘whistleblower’) who points out an opinion’s factual flaws”). 
94 See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 209, 212 (2005) (finding that two-thirds of offenders waive the right to appeal). 
95 In the federal system, for example, 86.7% of sentencing appeals are affirmed or dismissed.  U.S. 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2010 ANNUAL SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS, Table 56 (2010). 
96 Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the 
Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (1990). 
 17 
In theory, exhaustive data entry could compensate for gaps in the written 
explanation.  A member of the court staff, for example, could complete a checklist in 
every burglary case that indicates the presence of a weapon or an encounter with a victim.  
That way, future judges could see a complete picture of the case even if the written 
opinion contains omissions.  As a practical matter, however, such comprehensive data 
entry is prohibitively costly.  Every sentencing decision involves a theoretically infinite 
number of facts and factors, especially when including those not relevant in the particular 
case.  No court system realistically can code and transmit that kind of hyper-detailed 
information for every sentence.97  Accordingly, the need for comprehensive information 
forces a choice between keeping data-collection costs manageable and preventing errors 
that undermine inter-judge consistency and rationality. 
3.  Representative Information About Sentences 
Third, to accomplish its goals, the information sharing model depends on 
sentencing information that is representative.  According to proponents, information 
sharing reduces inter-judge disparity and promotes rationality by giving judges a 
“context” or “picture” of how each new case compares to previous cases.  Judges can 
then align their sentences to fit that picture.98  The trouble is that, in several ways, the 
picture can be skewed.   
One possibility is that the body of sentencing information may disproportionately 
reflect some kinds of cases.  Judges, after all, do not choose at random whether to write a 
detailed sentencing opinion.  Sometimes a judge chooses to issue a published opinion 
because the sentence presents a novel legal issue, and the bulk of the opinion is dedicated 
to that issue.99  Other times a judge chooses to issue a published opinion because the case 
is unusual.  Because of the extreme facts, or the controversial result, or the unusual 
degree of public interest, or some otherwise extraordinary aspect of the case, the judge 
feels the need to provide an extended explanation of the reasons for the sentence.100  
Time constraints not only make it impossible to prepare a written explanation in every 
case, but also force judges to be selective about which sentences warrant extended 
discussion.  Given the choice, judges often focus on groundbreaking, extreme, or 
otherwise special cases. 
That kind of imbalance, although understandable, presents serious problems for 
the information sharing model.  A store of sentencing information that consists 
disproportionately of extreme or unusual cases is incomplete, and therefore potentially 
deceptive, as a guide for judges in ordinary cases.  Indeed, it can cause the information 
sharing model to backfire.  Relying on a skewed body of information can undermine 
                                                 
97 See Schild, supra note 84, at 133-34. 
98 See supra notes 181-182and accompanying text. 
99 E.g. United States v. Pimental, 367 F. Supp. 2d 143, 149-54 (D. Mass. 2005) (Gertner, J.) (holding that 
the Sixth Amendment forbids the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing, or alternatively that 
acquitted conduct may be considered only if it is found beyond a reasonable doubt). 
100 E.g. United States v. Haynes, 557 F. Supp. 2d 200, (D. Mass. 2008) (Gertner, J.) (extended discussion of 
the defendant’s life history, employment, training, family responsibilities, good deeds, and other strong 
mitigating circumstances).  
 18 
rationality by creating inconsistency with “invisible” sentences that did not warrant a 
published opinion.101 
Another risk is that the body of sentencing information may disproportionately 
reflect the work of especially prolific judges.  It is no insult to the judiciary to recognize 
that different judges have different levels of enthusiasm for criminal sentencing.  Some 
judges, such as those Doug Berman has inducted to a mock “Sentencing Judges Hall of 
Fame,”102 relish the task and would eagerly participate in an inter-judge dialogue about 
sentencing outcomes.  But many others have little patience for sentencing, and little 
inclination to invest more time in preparing written opinions.103  Given the option, some 
judges may contribute more and better information than their colleagues. 
That poses a problem for the information sharing model because a non-
representative store of sentencing information, dominated by some voices while others 
remain silent, can exacerbate inter-judge disparity.  Future judges, guided by a skewed 
sense of previous sentencing patterns, might inadvertently misalign their decisions with 
those of less prolific judges.  The risk is particularly acute if “outlier” judges contribute 
more opinions and information than their colleagues—a plausible scenario, since judges 
have a special incentive to write a detailed opinion when they suspect that others may 
disagree with the outcome. 
B.   Information Dissemination Challenges 
Another set of challenges for the information sharing model relates to the 
dissemination of sentencing information.  Once collected, information about previous 
cases must somehow be made accessible to sentencing judges.  Yet because sentencing 
often turns on highly sensitive personal information about offenders, information sharing 
raises privacy concerns.  In addition, there are practical hurdles in making relevant 
sentencing opinions and statistics accessible to judges. 
1.  Privacy 
Sharing sentencing information with far-flung courts raises serious privacy 
concerns.  A written sentencing opinion or case record may disclose personal information 
about the offender.  Sentencing courts frequently rely on the offender’s criminal history, 
including any juvenile criminal record.  Judges may also consider the offender’s medical 
history, mental health, and physical condition, which may serve as mitigating factors at 
sentencing.  Work history and opportunities for employment may factor into the 
offender’s prospects for rehabilitation.  The court may also discuss the offender’s home 
and family life, including his performance as a parent, obligation to care for young 
children, or support from relatives.   In some cases, mitigating facts at sentencing include 
                                                 
101 Cf. AUSTIN LOVEGROVE, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, SENTENCING POLICY AND NUMERICAL GUIDANCE 
42 (1989) (“[I]t is acknowledged that there is disparity in sentencing, and it is important that a few 
disparate sentences should not appear to be the norm.”). 
102 Douglas Berman, Imagining a “Sentencing Judges Hall of Fame,” Sentencing Law and Policy, at http:// 
sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2004/11/a_thoughtful_an.html (Nov. 7, 2004). 
103 Bowman, supra note 89, at 356. 
 19 
profoundly personal information about the offender, such as a history of sexual or 
physical abuse.104   
Victims and other third parties also have privacy interests at stake.  Sentencing 
courts often emphasize the harm caused to victims of crime, which may require a 
discussion of medical, psychological, or economic injuries.  Witnesses who testify at 
sentencing, on behalf of the offender or the government, sometimes provide personal 
information and seek to keep their testimony confidential.  For a host of reasons, 
evidence at sentencing may be submitted under seal.  Yet a written opinion or case record 
designed to offer future judges a comprehensive picture of the case must, of necessity, 
disclose that information. 
Of particular concern is information about cooperation with the government.  
Offenders frequently receive a lower sentence because of their assistance to police or 
prosecutors, and a written sentencing opinion or case record may indicate the nature and 
extent of that cooperation.  Sentencing courts may also rely on the statements of 
cooperating witnesses who appear at sentencing, at trial, or before a grand jury.  That 
information is potentially explosive because it may expose the offender or family 
members to violence and retaliation.  The risk is chillingly real in the Internet age, when 
web sites like “Who’s A Rat?” make it easier than ever to identify and locate people who 
cooperate with the government.105   
Courts’ treatment of presentence reports (PSRs) underscores those privacy 
concerns.  A PSR is a written document, usually prepared by a member of the court staff 
or probation officer, designed to assist the judge at sentencing.  In most jurisdictions, a 
PSR is prepared as a matter of routine in felony cases.106  Like a written opinion or case 
record, the PSR may contain personal information about the offender, victims, family 
members, or third parties.107  Recognizing those privacy interests, courts have a 
longstanding practice of maintaining the confidentiality of PSRs.108  Indeed, for decades, 
it was controversial to disclose the report even to the offender.109  Disclosure to third 
parties is almost always forbidden.  As one federal judge put it, “I guess I feel strongly 
that such information should not be made accessible to anyone outside the case.”110 
                                                 
104 Cf. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing facts disclosed in a 
presentence report, and concluding that “[t]he criminal defendant has a strong interest in maintaining the 
confidentiality of [the] report”). 
105 See Who’s A Rat – About Us, at http://www.whosarat.com/aboutus.php. 
106 See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1)(a) (requiring a presentence investigation and report, except in a few 
circumstances). 
107 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) (setting forth required contents of federal presentence reports); OFFICE OF 
PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVICES, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT (2006), ch. III-1 to III-
44, available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/publication%20107.pdf (guidance to probation officers 
responsible for preparing presentence reports). 
108 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 12 (1988) (“[C]ourts have been very reluctant to give third 
parties access to the presentence investigation report prepared for some other individual or individuals.”) 
(emphasis removed).  
109 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2) (advisory committee notes to 1966 amendments) (collecting sources and 
describing the “heated controversy” over “[w]hether as a matter of policy the defendant should be accorded 
some opportunity to see and refute allegations made in such reports”). 
110 Ian Urbina, New York’s Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at 
B1(quoting Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr.) (discussing disclosure of sentencing documents to Congress). 
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2.  Accessibility and Relevance 
Another challenge in disseminating sentencing information is ensuring that the 
relevant information is easily accessible.  As noted above, the information sharing model 
depends on a pool of information that is written, comprehensive, and representative.111  
Beyond that, however, judges also need some way to wade through the available 
information and zero in on what is useful.  For information sharing to reduce inter-judge 
disparity, sentencing judges need a way to find similar cases, comparing previous 
sentences with a new set of facts.  Only then can they impose a sentence along the same 
lines.  Likewise, for information sharing to promote rationality, sentencing judges need to 
consult the reasoning of other courts in relevant cases.  Only then can they write an 
opinion accepting that reasoning or distinguishing the case, for the benefit of future 
judges. 
Accordingly, a centerpiece of the information sharing model is some system—an 
electronic database, a web site, or a set of shared files, for example—that allows 
sentencing judges to search for previous decisions that are similar and relevant.  But 
because of practical challenges in building such a system, judges may be discouraged 
from making effective use of the available information. 
First, the complexity of sentencing decisions complicates the design of any search 
system.  With a theoretically infinite number of variables in play, no search form or user 
interface can capture them all.  Instead, the designers of the system of necessity must 
select some search parameters to include, while ignoring others.112  That process is 
subjective and controversial. 
For example, a system might allow judges to search previous sentences based on 
the offender’s criminal history.  But that kind of search could take many forms.  It may 
be implemented as a yes/no field (i.e. did the offender have any prior criminal history?).  
Or it might include two yes/no fields, one for juvenile criminal history and another for 
adult criminal history.  Or it might include a single scaled search parameter that captures 
the total number of prior offenses, or the total number of adult offenses, or the total 
number violent offenses, or all of the above.  Or it might include search parameters based 
on the offender’s age at the time of his first offense, or at the time of the most recent 
offense, or a hundred other variations.  As the designers of one sentencing information 
system lamented, “[i]t does not take a mathematical wizard to realize that if there are 
even as few as three or four levels of these [criminal history] variables, there are over 700 
combinations of aspects of this one variable—criminal record.”113  One researcher 
estimates that the total number of combinations of criminal history parameters alone 
“would reach into the tens of thousands.”114  Even the massive datafiles created by the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, which are breathtaking in their complexity, could not 
support searches on many of the criminal-history factors described above.115   
                                                 
111 See supra Part II.A.1 to II.A.3. 
112 Schild, supra note 84, at 132; Miller, supra note 181, at 134. 
113 Anthony N. Doob & N. W. Park, Computerized Sentencing Information for Judges, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 54, 
61 (1987). 
114 Schild, supra note 84, at 133. 
115 For criminal history, the datafiles include a yes/no variable, criminal history points and category scores 
that indirectly reflect a host of underlying criminal history facts, a count of “incidents” classified according 
to level of seriousness, and adjustments for committing the instant offense while under various forms of 
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Many other factors relevant at sentencing are equally complex and difficult to 
operationalize.  The problem is that there no “right” design.  Each variation of those 
search parameters is potentially relevant, and different judges may prefer different 
options.  By picking some limited number for searching, and excluding others altogether, 
system designers risk alienating judges.  Why bother with a search system that seems 
focused on all the wrong issues? 
Worse, the subjectivity of search parameters can threaten inter-judge consistency.  
Suppose, for example, a search system allows judges to search for cases in which the 
offender’s criminal history included any “violent” prior offenses.  Although judges might 
broadly agree that violent criminal history is highly relevant at sentencing, they may 
disagree about what offenses qualify as violent or nonviolent.  The hypothetical case 
described above, in which an armed burglar confronts a homeowner at night but never 
fires or even brandishes the firearm, might be a close case.  If judges’ differing views 
about what qualifies as “violent” are embedded into the search parameters, the system 
may “lock in” inter-judge disparity by concealing the disagreement from future users.116 
Nor would full-text searching of written opinions solve the problem.  In other 
contexts, judges (and their law clerks) typically find relevant case law using electronic 
services like Westlaw and LexisNexis, which offer sophisticated search tools.117  Flexible 
as they are, however, those services would have significant limitations as a means of 
reliably identifying similar cases.  The language that judges use to describe offense and 
offender characteristics varies enormously from opinion to opinion, making it easy for 
factually similar cases to escape notice.118 
Second, the volume of sentencing decisions makes the search for similar cases 
difficult.  If the system provides too few search parameters, judges may discover that an 
overwhelming number of cases seem relevant.119  At a high level of generality, each case 
may be “similar” to hundreds or even thousands of others.  Given their time constraints, 
sentencing judges cannot carefully review so many potentially relevant cases.120  
Presented with a daunting volume of matches, judges may give up. 
                                                                                                                                                 
court supervision.  See U.S. Sentencing Commission, VARIABLE CODEBOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS 
7-80 (2010).   The Commission’s data do not, however, capture which prior incidents were “violent,” or the 
age of the offender at the time of each incident, or the time elapsed since each incident, or the name or type 
of court that adjudicated the prior incident. 
116 Uri Schild acknowledges this difficulty, but maintains that it is “not really a problem” because users are 
interested only in whether the judge thought the offense was violent (or serious or aberrant, etc.) and 
“passed sentence accordingly.”  Schild, supra note 84, at 133.  The nature of the offense “objectively 
speaking” does not matter.  Id.  He is mistaken.  The whole point of reducing inter-judge disparity is to 
ensure that “objectively” similar offenders receive equivalent sentences. 
117 Peter W. Martin, Reconfiguring Law Reports and the Concept of Precedent for a Digital Age, 53 VILL. 
L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2008).  Notably, however, not all state trial courts can afford subscriptions to those 
services, leaving judges to rely on the parties or to conduct research using more traditional and less flexible 
methods.  Id. at 27. 
118 As a thought experiment, try to devise a search of written opinions that would capture all sentences in 
which the offender’s criminal history included a violent crime.  The terms “violent” or “violence” would 
not necessarily appear in the opinion, and the possible synonyms are endless: “armed,” “weapon,” 
“firearm,” “gun,” “knife,” “attack,” “brandish,” and dozens of others.  Picking out the relevant results 
would be time consuming, and could never guarantee that all relevant cases had been discovered. 
119 Schild, supra note 84, at 134. 
120 Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a 
Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1623 (1995) (discussing the cost advantages of limiting the 
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If, on the other hand, the system provides too many search parameters, then 
searches frequently will yield no results.  In sentencing, no two cases are exactly alike, 
any more than two human beings are exactly alike.  Indeed, a key premise of the 
information sharing model is that judges can develop more rational sentencing law by 
offering principled reasons to distinguish between dissimilar cases.  As a practical matter, 
however, judges who search for matching cases and constantly come up empty may 
conclude that the exercise is a waste of time.  This level-of-generality problem should not 
be overstated, as diligent legal researchers know that if one search returns 10,000 results, 
and the next returns zero, they should continue to refine their parameters until the results 
are manageable.  Nonetheless, the volume of sentences creates special challenges in 
making relevant results readily accessible to judges. 
The volume of sentencing decisions also can threaten the accuracy and usefulness 
of the information.  The information sharing model anticipates that sentencing judges will 
serve both as producers and consumers of information.  In that sense, all judges are 
interdependent, relying on one another to make contributions to a central pool of 
information.  For some judges, however, a crushing case load or other time constraints 
may result in errors or hurried and unhelpful written explanations.  In turn, that inaccurate 
or inadequate information can frustrate others, who will find the system less useful.  A 
vicious cycle is possible, as everyone begins to doubt that painstaking accuracy and 
thoughtful opinions will actually benefit their colleagues.  As computer programmers say, 
“garbage in, garbage out.” 
In short, is naïve to expect, in the words of Judge Sweet, that making sentencing 
information available to other judges will “almost automatically” provide “a firmament 
of reference points and a body of reasoning” that can “alleviat[e] unwarranted disparity” 
between judges.121  Making relevant sentencing information accessible to judges is 
anything but “automatic.” 
C.   Voluntariness Challenges 
Assuming that written, comprehensive, and representative information has been 
collected, and the relevant information is accessible, the information sharing model 
predicts that judges will seek out that information and treat it as persuasive, perhaps even 
authoritative.  By design, the model is voluntary, leaving sentencing judges free to decide 
whether and how to consult information about previous cases.  The idea is not to 
constrain judges, but to assist them in the exercise of “fully informed discretion.”122  
Information sharing will reduce inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, the 
argument goes, because judges who otherwise would have reached a contrary result will 
instead conform their sentences those of their colleagues.   
                                                                                                                                                 
number of precedents a trial judge must consult); Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: 
Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 20 (1990) (noting that 
trial courts cannot engage in the “costly, complex” process of reviewing all relevant appellate precedent on 
a particular legal issue, and therefore may “reduce its costs by considering only a subset of relevant 
appellate decisions”). 
121 Sweet et al., supra note 5, at 943, 946. 
122 Wolff, supra note 2, at 97; MISSOURI SENTENCING ADVISORY COMMISSION, RECOMMENDED 
SENTENCING: REPORT AND IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE 11-13 (2005), available at http:// 
www.mosac.mo.gov. 
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The unspoken assumption of the model is that the primary source of inter-judge 
disparity and irrationality is ignorance.  Judges broadly agree about sentencing, on this 
view, and reach inconsistent results only because they lack information about how other 
courts have handled similar cases.  Accordingly, “sentencing disparity would virtually 
disappear if judges had access to data about their colleagues’ decisions.”123   
That premise is unrealistic.  Inter-judge disparity results not merely from a lack of 
information, but from deep disagreements about sentencing values and priorities.  
Surveys of judges, for example, have revealed persistent differences of opinion about 
important sentencing principles and policies.124  Judges are particularly divided, for 
example, on hot-button criminal justice topics like child pornography, drug trafficking, 
and white-collar fraud.125  My own research on sentencing in the federal system has 
documented a sharp spike in inter-judge disparity following the shift from mandatory to 
advisory guidelines,126 despite the absence of any changes in judges’ access to sentencing 
information.  Other research reveals significant differences in sentencing outcomes 
between Democratic and Republican appointees.127  In light of those basic disagreements, 
it is unrealistic to expect that sentencing judges in a voluntary system will dutifully fall 
into line when supplied with information about their colleagues’ decisions.   
Instead, when judges disagree in good faith with the actions of their colleagues, 
there is every reason to believe they will disregard the information and impose a sentence 
they believe is just and appropriate.  The result will be persistent inter-judge disparity.  It 
is possible that, over time, voluntary information sharing could foster a “dialogue” 
between judges that resolves the disagreement, as courts settle on one view or the other.  
But it is equally possible that the disagreement will continue, with dueling courts 
committed to opposing views.  A purely voluntary model is powerless to correct that 
problem.128 
Disregarding the information, moreover, is not the only alternative to falling in 
line with other judges’ decisions.  Consider three other possibilities.  First, judges can 
avoid discovering the information in the first place.  When judges know or suspect that 
their preferred sentence is out of step with those of their colleagues, nothing in a 
voluntary system prevents them from simply ignoring the available information.  Such a 
“see no evil, hear no evil” impulse would thwart the information sharing model in 
precisely those cases where it could be most useful. 
Second, judges can keep looking.  Upon discovering information about past 
sentences that run contrary to their own preferences, they can continue to mine the 
                                                 
123 Zenoff, supra note 16, at 1451 (describing the view of “[s]ome observers”). 
124 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 
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for outlier sentences”). 
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available opinions in search of more favorable.  Behavioral literature on confirmation 
bias has documented similar cognitive errors in other contexts.129  Confirmation bias 
describes the tendency to unwittingly select and interpret evidence in a manner that 
confirms a previously held belief or hypothesis, while minimizing or failing to recognize 
contrary evidence.130  Previous research has documented confirmation bias among 
prosecutors, police, and jurors,131 and the same tendency undoubtedly exists among 
judges.132   
Although concerns about cognitive errors like confirmation bias should not be 
overstated,133 the complexity of sentencing decisions creates conditions that may 
facilitate confirmation bias.  At a high level of generality, many offenses and offenders 
share common characteristics, providing judges with a wealth of “confirming” data points 
that may reinforce their intuitions.  Yet in the details, sentences are as infinitely variable 
as human beings,134 allowing courts to draw infinite distinctions that minimize the 
importance of “disconfirming” data points. 
Third, judges can become even more polarized.  Judges confronted with 
information about previous sentencing patterns may not only reject their colleagues’ 
approach, but stake out an even more extreme position.  That kind of “attitude 
polarization” effect finds some support in psychology literature as well.135  In a seminal 
study, for example, test subjects who held opposing views about capital punishment grew 
more polarized after reading identical information about conflicting research on the 
deterrent effect of the death penalty.136  As Cass Sunstein has explained, at least when 
                                                 
129 See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 
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biases.  See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 
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134 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
135 Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on 
Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 2098 (1979).   
136 Id. at 2100-05.  But see Arthur G. Miller et al., The Attitude Polarization Phenomenon: Role of 
Response Measure, Attitude Extremity, and Behavioral Consequences of Reported Attitude Change, 64 J. 
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people begin with strongly held views, a “balanced presentation[]” in which “competing 
arguments or positions are laid out side by side” is likely to increase rather than reduce 
attitude polarization.137  Information sharing, in other words, does not inevitably result in 
agreement and uniformity.  To the contrary, in some circumstances it can harden 
individuals’ resolve and make disagreements more pronounced. 
III.  EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SENTENCING INFORMATION SHARING 
These challenges are not merely speculative.  New and existing empirical research 
tends to confirm the fundamental weaknesses of the information sharing model.  This 
Article first reports the results of an original study of federal sentencing data collection.  
It then examines the history of two reform efforts grounded in the information sharing 
model, “sentencing information systems” and “sentencing councils.”  Collectively, the 
research reinforces the serious challenges related to information collection, information 
dissemination, and voluntariness.   
A.   An Empirical Study of the Collection of Sentencing Information 
Virtually no empirical research has examined the collection of sentencing 
information.  As explained above, the information sharing model depends on a store of 
sentencing information that is written, comprehensive, and representative.  Promoting 
rationality in sentencing decisions requires thoughtful and principled explanations and a 
continuing dialogue between judges, which is impossible without written sentencing 
opinions.138  Likewise, comprehensive and representative information is crucial, since a 
skewed body of previous decisions can actually deepen inter-judge disparity.139  No study 
has tested the feasibility of that kind of information collection. 
To fill that gap, this Article reports the results of an original study of the 
collection of sentencing information.  Drawing on a unique dataset of sentencing 
documents from a federal district court, it evaluates the quantity and characteristics of 
written sentence explanations submitted pursuant to mandatory reporting requirements.  
Because the documents that form the basis for the analysis are generally nonpublic, the 
analysis is the first of its kind in the United States. 
    1.  Data and Coding    
The study is based on a key federal sentencing document called the “Statement of 
Reasons.”  In federal court, sentencing judges must complete a Statement of Reasons in 
connection with every criminal sentence.140  Upon completion, the document is 
transmitted to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which extracts and records data about 
the sentence.141  The Commission then generates massive datafiles, based on the contents 
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of tens of thousands of documents each year, to serve as the basis for statistical reports 
about nationwide sentencing practices.  To ensure that complete and comprehensive data 
are available, the Chief Judge of every federal district court is required by statute to 
“ensure” that in every case a “written statement of the reasons for the sentence imposed” 
is submitted, in a format specified by the Commission.142 
To understand how the Statement of Reasons works, a brief summary of federal 
sentencing practice may be helpful.  The U.S. Sentencing Commission has promulgated 
detailed sentencing guidelines that translate offense and offender characteristics into a 
sentencing range, expressed as a narrow range of months of imprisonment (such as 52-63 
months).  The guideline range is “advisory,”143 meaning that judges must “consider” the 
advisory guideline range in every case, but they are free to impose any reasonable 
sentence consistent with a “laundry list” statute that sets out broad purposes of 
punishment.144  Within-range sentences reflect the sentencing court’s judgment that the 
guideline range that is proper for the “mine run” of similar cases, and that the particular 
offense and offender are “not different enough to warrant a different sentence.”145 
The Statement of Reasons form is adapted to the guidelines regime.  It is four 
pages long, and requires that judges provide basic information about the sentence 
imposed.146  Judges must check a box indicating whether the sentence falls within, above, 
or below the advisory guideline range.  They also have the option of checking boxes that 
correspond to reasons for an out-of-guidelines sentence.147  The checkboxes express the 
reasons for the sentence in very general terms, such as “aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances” or “the nature and circumstances of the offense.”148   
Most relevant for present purposes, the form provides several spaces in which 
judges may provide a narrative description of the reasons for the sentence.149  The form 
states that a written narrative description is “required” in two categories of cases: (1) all 
sentences outside the guideline range; and (2) all sentences within the guideline range 
that carry a term of imprisonment of “greater than 24 months.”150  Judges sometimes use 
the back of the form or attach additional pages or documents, such as a written sentencing 
opinion or a transcript of the sentencing hearing.   
The Statement of Reasons form is usually secret and confidential, pursuant to a 
policy statement issued by the Judicial Conference of the United States.151  But one 
                                                 
142 28 U.S.C. § 994(w), (w)(1). 
143 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
144 Id. 
145 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007). 
146 See, e.g., Judgment and Statement of Reasons in United States v. Karim, No. 1:05-CR-10264-001 DPW, 
at 7 [hereinafter Statement of Reasons Form] (on file with author). 
147 Id. at 8-9. 
148 Statement of Reasons Form 8-9.  The checkboxes correspond to the titles of guideline departures, see 
U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0, K52.13, and broad purposes of punishment, see § 3553(a)(1).  The checkboxes 
themselves provide no information about the particular case.  Judges can check a box marked “Age,” for 
example, but the checkbox does not indicate whether the offender was young or old. 
149 Id. at 8 (“Explain the facts justifying the departure.”); id. at 9 (“Explain the facts justifying a sentence 
outside the advisory guideline system.”); id. at 10 (“ADDITIONAL FACTS JUSTIFYING THE 
SENTENCE IN THIS CASE”). 
150 See Statement of Reasons Form 8, 10. 
151 See Judicial Conference Policy Statement, Report of the Proceedings of the United States Judicial 
Conference, Mar. 14, 2001, at 14. 
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federal district court, the District of Massachusetts, has voted to make Statements of 
Reasons available to the public on the PACER system (Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records).152  That decision affords a rare opportunity to study sentencing practices that 
remain hidden in every other federal court.  The open-access policy reflects the court’s 
admirable commitment to greater transparency in criminal sentencing.153   
To assess the kind of information collected using the Statement of Reasons, the 
study examines a full year (fiscal year 2006154) of cases from the District of 
Massachusetts.  A total of 411 statements were reviewed and coded, representing 
approximately 80% of the Statements of Reasons submitted to the Commission that 
year.155  Details concerning document selection are set forth in the Appendix. 
Of particular interest is whether the Statements of Reasons supply the kind of 
written, comprehensive, and representative explanations necessary to support an effective 
information sharing model.  Accordingly, the study examines the length of any written 
statement explaining the judge’s reasons, measured by the number of sentences of text 
contained in the narrative description.  Such a “sentence count” admittedly captures only 
the length, and not the quality, of the written explanation.  But the length of the narrative 
description is a fairly reliable proxy for the level of factual detail and the thoroughness of 
the judge’s reasoning.  The study classifies a narrative description of 1-3 sentences as a 
“short” explanation.  It classifies a narrative description of 4-9 sentences, at least a 
paragraph but less than a page, as a “medium” explanation.  It classifies a narrative 
description of 10 or more sentences of text, roughly one page, as a “long” explanation. 
2.  Results 
The results are discouraging.  As shown in Figure 1, even in cases where a written 
explanation of the reasons for the sentence is mandatory,156 most Statements of Reasons 
contain no written explanation at all.  Only a small fraction of the documents contain a 
comprehensive explanation. 
 
Figure 1:  Explanation Provided, Where Written Explanation Is Mandatory 
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006 (n = 317) 
 
                                                 
152 United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 278 n.66 (D. Mass. 2004) (Young, C.J.) (citing Minutes of 
the Court Meeting (D. Mass.), Sept. 4, 2001, at 4). 
153 United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 333 n.76 (D. Mass. 2006) (Young, J.). 
154 The analysis includes Statements of Reasons filed in the Commission’s 2006 fiscal year, which runs 
from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006. 
155 See infra Appendix Part A.1.  
156 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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For cases in which a written narrative description is required, the Statement of Reasons 
contains no indication whatsoever of the judge’s reasons in 48.6% of cases.157  In another 
9.1% of cases, the only indication of the judge’s reasons is a checkmark in a box 
corresponding to a broad reason for the decision (such as “aggravating or mitigating 
factors” or “the circumstances of the offense”).  Together, that means that in 57.7% of 
cases—more than half—the document contains no written narrative description, despite 
the Commission’s reporting requirements.  Such a low rate of written explanations is a 
major obstacle for the information sharing model, given the importance of written 
opinions in fostering a “dialogue” between sentencing courts, and thereby promoting 
rationality in sentencing law.158 
Nor are the available written explanations comprehensive.  In 27.1% of cases, the 
document provides only a short narrative explanation of up to three sentences of text, and 
in another 9.1% of cases it provides a medium-length explanation of 4-9 sentences.  That 
kind of quick summary represents an improvement over a checklist, but would be of little 
                                                 
157 As discussed infra, the percentage of sentences with no written explanation is much lower for non-
guideline sentences (28.6%) than for within-range sentences of more than 24 months (78.7%).  But because 
a written explanation is mandatory in both circumstances, Figure 1 reports the level of explanation for both 
categories combined. 
158 See supra Part II.A.1.  Checkmarks indicating only a general topic area are insufficient to promote inter-
judge consistency and rationality.  See United States v. Blackie, 548 F.3d 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(vacating sentence for lack of an adequate explanation because court merely checked boxes indicating 
reasons for the sentence, without discussing any facts related to the offense or offender). 
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use to future courts drawing upon that information to develop a rational body of 
sentencing law.  The explanation can highlight a few factors that the judge deemed most 
important, but of necessity many relevant facts must be omitted, and there can be room 
for only a bare-bones explanation of how the judge weighed the competing facts and 
considerations.   Short-shrift explanations pose a problem for the information sharing 
model because incomplete opinions may fail to capture facts that future judges deem 
important, masking important similarities or differences between cases and thereby 
generating inter-judge disparity and undermining rationality.159   
There is some good news.  In a small number of cases (6.0%), the judge provided 
a long written explanation consisting of at least 10 sentences of text.  Indeed, in a handful 
of cases (1.1%), the judge wrote a formal sentencing opinion or attached a hearing 
transcript that includes more than 50 sentences of explanation.  Those opinions are 
outstanding, offering future judges not only a full sense of the relevant facts, but also 
valuable insights into the sentencing judge’s reasons and approach. 
Unfortunately, those cases tend to be unusual, resulting in a non-representative 
body of long written opinions.  As shown in Figure 2, sentences outside the guideline 
range are more likely to produce a long explanation than sentences within the guideline 
range. 
  
                                                 
159 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 30 
Figure 2:  Long Explanation Provided, by Guideline Range 
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006 (n = 411) 
 
 
 
For sentences within the advisory guideline range, the Statement of Reasons contains a 
long explanation, consisting of 10 sentences of text or more, in just 2.5% of cases.  But 
for sentences outside that range—those different from the “mine run” of similar 
cases160—the likelihood of a long explanation is roughly four times greater.  The 
documents contain a long explanation for 9.9% of below-range sentences and for 8.3% of 
above-range sentences.  The result is a skewed collection of long written descriptions.161  
A store of sentencing information that consists disproportionately of unusual or extreme 
cases poses a real threat to the information sharing model, since a skewed backdrop may 
mislead judges about sentencing patterns in cases that are ordinary, but effectively 
invisible.162 
The pool of long written explanations is non-representative in another way.  Some 
judges were far less likely to provide full explanations than others.  Figure 3 shows, for 
                                                 
160 In theory, a judge is free to impose a non-guideline sentence even in an “ordinary” case based on policy-
driven disagreement with the guideline range.  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108-09 (2007).  
That is exceedingly rare, however; sentencing courts overwhelmingly justify their non-guideline sentences 
based on the special facts of the case. 
161 By way of comparison, in the full set of 411 sentences, 67% are within-range sentences.  In the subset of 
20 sentences with a long explanation, however, just 35% are within-range sentences. 
162 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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each judge with a criminal caseload of at least 15 sentences during the year of the 
study,163 the percentage of cases in which the judge provided a long written explanation. 
 
Figure 3:  Percentage of Cases with Long Explanation, by Judge 
Minimum Caseload Required (13 judges total) 
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006 
 
 
Not all judges wrote long explanations of their sentences at equal rates.164  Six of the 13 
judges who met the minimum-caseload requirement did not submit any long explanations 
during the year of the study.  By contrast, one judge provided a long explanation for 
21.1% of sentences, and another provided a long explanation for 33.3% of sentences.   
As a result, the pool of sentences with long written explanations is imbalanced, 
with some judges far better represented than their colleagues.  Judge 13 singlehandedly 
accounts for 45% of long opinions submitted the year of the study.  That is more than 
Judges 1 through 10 combined.  Together the court’s three most prolific authors of long 
opinions account for 80% of the court’s output of long written explanations.  A body of 
sentencing information in which some judges have a dominant voice, while others remain 
silent, can exacerbate inter-judge disparity and undermine rationality by creating a 
distorted impression of actual sentencing patterns.165 
                                                 
163 For further discussion of the minimum-caseload requirement, see infra Appendix Part B. 
164 In this table and throughout the Article, I use numbers rather than names to identify individual judges.  
See Scott, supra note 14, at 140-41. 
165 See supra Part II.A.3. 
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Those differences are not the product of chance.  As set forth in the Appendix, 
logistic regression models confirm that the pool of written explanations is significantly 
imbalanced.166  First, some judges and some kinds of cases are more likely to produce a 
written explanation than others.  Non-guideline sentences are significantly and strongly 
correlated with written explanations (b = 3.320, p < .001).  Likewise, longer terms of 
imprisonment are significantly, although more weakly, correlated with written 
explanations (b = 0.007, p = .001).  Categorical variables capturing the identity of the 
sentencing judge are also a significant predictor of whether a written explanation is 
provided (p = .001).  Surprisingly, however, the fact that a written explanation is 
mandatory is not itself a significant predictor of a written explanation, after controlling 
for other factors (b = 0.719, p = .214).167 
Second, some kinds of cases are more likely than others to produce a long written 
explanation consisting of 10 or more sentences of text.  Non-guideline sentences are 
significantly correlated with long explanations (b = 1.086, p = .037).  Neither sentence 
length (b = -0.003, p = .482) nor the fact that a written explanation is mandatory 
(b = 1.338, p = .234), however, is a statistically significant predictor of a long 
explanation.168 
3.  Implications 
These findings suggest that challenges in collecting written, comprehensive, and 
representative sentencing information are formidable.  Even in a regime of detailed and 
mandatory reporting requirements, backed by a federal statute, the available pool of 
written sentencing opinions is limited. 
For three reasons, however, these results should be interpreted with caution.  First, 
Statements of Reasons are not designed as a way for judges to share information with one 
another.  At present, their sole audience is the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which uses 
the documents as inputs for its statistical reports.  No one else has access to the judge’s 
statements, no matter how insightful or well-reasoned169—and judges know it.  They 
therefore have little incentive (aside from the commands of federal law170) to explain 
their decisions in detail.  Data collection efforts surely would improve if judges believed 
that their written explanations would reach a wider audience. 
Second, the Statement of Reasons form itself is clumsy and cumbersome.  
Scarcely concealing its intended use as a data-entry tool for the Commission, it consists 
primarily of a “parade of nearly meaningless check boxes.”171  That format no doubt 
discourages judges from providing more thorough narrative descriptions of the reasons 
for a sentence.172  With a more open-ended form that encouraged judges to set out their 
reasons, the contents of the statements might be richer and more useful. 
                                                 
166 For more information about variables used in the regression models, see the Appendix, infra Part B.   
167 See Appendix, infra Part C & tbl. 1.  
168 See Appendix, infra Part C & tbl. 2. 
169 Bruce Green, Thinking About White-Collar Crime and Punishment, CRIM. JUSTICE (Fall 2010), at 5. 
170 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(w), (w)(1) (requiring that the Chief Judge of each federal district court “ensure” the 
completion of a statement of reasons in whatever format the Commission specifies). 
171 Steven L. Chanenson, Write On!, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 146, 146 (2006). 
172 Id. 
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Third, this study examines documents from a single federal district court.  Data 
collection practices in one district may not be representative of practices in other federal 
courts nationwide, or in state courts responsible for the vast majority of criminal 
sentences.  And the District of Massachusetts, admittedly, is far from ordinary when it 
comes to sentencing issues.  Several members of the court are well-respected as 
sentencing experts.  Judges Nancy Gertner and William Young have written scholarly 
articles on sentencing issues,173 and Judge Patti Saris now serves as Chair of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission.174  Moreover, the same commitment to transparency that led the 
District of Massachusetts to approve its unique disclosure policy might make its data 
reporting practices materially different from those of other courts. 
On the other hand, because of the distinctive features of the District of 
Massachusetts, this study likely underestimates the challenges in collecting high-quality 
sentencing information.  Unlike other courts, the District of Massachusetts has 
consciously chosen to make its Statements of Reasons widely available.  The judges 
know that their reasons will not simply be filed away in a drawer, but ordinarily will be 
accessible to the public.  If anything, the court’s special interest in sentencing likely 
translates into more frequent and more thorough written opinions, not less.  In addition, 
federal judges enjoy a larger support staff, more law clerks, and a slower criminal docket 
than their counterparts in state courts.175  If the collection of sentencing information is 
inadequate in the District of Massachusetts—widely recognized as one of the best 
sentencing courts in the country—then it is probably even worse elsewhere. 
The study thus reinforces that information collection challenges are substantial.  
Despite explicit reporting requirements, sentencing courts face time pressures and other 
constraints that prevent them from routinely providing written, comprehensive, and 
representative information. 
B.   Research on Previous Reform Efforts 
In addition to this original research, insights about the information sharing model 
can be derived from the experiences of previous sentencing reform efforts grounded in 
information sharing.  Two efforts are particularly salient: (1) “sentencing information 
systems,” searchable computer databases of sentencing information constructed in a 
handful of jurisdictions around the world; and (2) “sentencing councils,” periodic 
roundtable discussions of sentencing judges on the same court.  The struggles of those 
reform efforts, and their occasional successes, underscore serious challenges with 
information dissemination and voluntariness. 
                                                 
173 See, e.g., Gertner, supra note 4; William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, 50 FED. 
LAW 30 (July 2003). 
174 She has written scholarly articles on sentencing as well.  See Hon. Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar 
Screen: Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge’s Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 1027 (1997). 
175 Although some federal courts are deluged with criminal immigration cases, prompting the development 
of “fast track” disposition programs, the District of Massachusetts had no such program at the time of the 
study. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl. 
MA-06 (2006) (no departures imposed pursuant to an “early disposition program”). 
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1.  Sentencing Information Systems 
In the last 25 years, a handful of jurisdictions worldwide has experimented with 
sentencing information systems (SISs), searchable electronic databases of sentencing 
information.  Although their designs vary, the goal of SISs is to enable judges to look up 
statistics, case summaries, written opinions, or other information about previous 
sentences in similar cases.176  Using interactive search forms, a judge preparing to impose 
sentence enters some key characteristics of the case.  The SIS responds by reporting 
information about matching cases.  Some systems provide only aggregated information 
about whole categories of cases, such as the distribution of nationwide sentences for 
aggravated theft.  Others provide specific information about individual cases, such as the 
case summary or full sentencing opinion in a relevant case.177  Courts in Canada, 
Scotland, Ireland, and Australia have launched large-scale experiments with SISs.178 In 
the United States, Missouri has constructed a web-based system that could be described 
as an SIS.179 
The primary goals of an SIS, in the jurisdictions that have adopted them, are to 
reduce inter-judge sentencing disparity and to promote rationality.180  When a judge 
sentences an offender, an SIS can provide a statistical picture of how similar offenders 
have been sentenced before, by other judges in the same court, region, or nation.181  
Making better information available to judges, the argument goes, makes it possible for 
judges to align their decisions with those of their colleagues, and thus produces more 
consistent and better-reasoned sentences.182 
Surprisingly, to date no empirical research has examined whether any SIS has 
succeeded in reducing inter-judge sentencing disparity.183  The indirect evidence, 
however, is disheartening.  Many of the most prominent SISs in foreign courts have been 
abandoned.  Further, in jurisdictions where SISs have survived, they have taken on more 
of a support role following the implementation of other structured sentencing reforms. 
                                                 
176 Marc Miller, Sentencing Reform “Reform” Through Sentencing Information Systems, in THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT (Michael Tonry ed. 2004) at 121, 129.   
177 See Ivan Potas et al., The Sentencing Information System of the Judicial Commission of New South 
Wales, 6 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 99, 109-11 (1998) (describing the New South Wales SIS, complete with 
pictures of the user interface). 
178 Miller, supra note 176, at 129; Coulter, supra note 7, at 4. 
179 Wolff, supra note 51, at __. 
180 Austin Lovegrove, Statistical Information Systems as a Means to Consistency and Rationality in 
Sentencing, 7 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 31, 32 (1999) (“The primary aim of those systems is to promote 
consistency and rationality—the idea is that cases described by similar relevant characteristics should 
receive similar sentences.”). 
181 Marc Miller, Sentencing Reform “Reform” Through Sentencing Information Systems, in THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT (Michael Tonry ed. 2004) at 121, 129. 
182 Id. at 135; THE SENTENCING COMMISSION FOR SCOTLAND, THE SCOPE TO IMPROVE CONSISTENCY IN 
SENTENCING 36 (2006) (SISs “can be used to inform sentencing decision making and increase consistency 
within and between sentencers”). 
183 Miller, supra note 181, at 133; Schild, supra note 84, at 127.  The courts that have experimented with 
SISs apparently do not capture and publicize the kind of data necessary to support such research.  See Arie 
Freiberg, Australia: Exercising Discretion in Sentencing Policy and Practice, 22 FED. SENT’G RPTR. 204, 
206 (2010).  As a result there is no direct evidence that the availability of an SIS improves inter-judge 
consistency. 
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In Canada, four provinces experimented with SISs in the late 1980s.184  A 
national sentencing commission had concluded that “detailed information on current 
practices” would prove valuable to sentencing judges,185 and surveys of judges had 
revealed a widespread appetite for better information about past sentencing outcomes.186  
Although judges were not required to search the Canadian SIS when imposing sentence, 
the designers worked closely with judges to design useful and relevant search 
parameters.187 
It did not work.  Within a few years, the Canadian SIS experiment was abandoned 
because judges declined to use it.188  The system’s architect attributed its demise to the 
fact that the reform was strictly voluntary.  He was surprised to discover that “[j]udges do 
not, as a rule, care to know what sentences other judges are handing down in comparable 
cases.”189  Judges were especially reluctant to use the system, he reported, “if they knew 
(or thought) that these other judges have different approaches” than their own.190 
Similarly, in Scotland, an SIS was developed for judges of the High Court of 
Justiciary, which handles sentencing for some of the nation’s most serious criminal 
offenses.  Following a trial period in 1997, the SIS became available to all of the court’s 
judges in 2002.  Judges themselves proposed developing the system, principally as a 
defensive measure to head off more intrusive reforms (such as presumptive sentencing 
guidelines) that would have sharply limited their discretion.191  As in Canada, judges 
worked closely with designers of the SIS to define the available search parameters.192  
The result, according to its creators, was a highly flexible and valuable resource.193 
 Yet the Scottish SIS collapsed as well.  In 2006, just a few years after the system 
became widely available, the Sentencing Commission of Scotland reported that the 
system “was not widely used” and had “largely fallen into abeyance.”194  Judges “rarely” 
used the system to gather information, and “rarely” took the time to enter narrative 
information concerning their own sentencing decisions.195  The data were also incomplete 
and at times inaccurate.196  The Commission found that “currently the SIS does not have 
anything other than the most marginal of impacts on the imposition of sentences.”197  In 
                                                 
184 Anthony N. Doob & Norman W. Park, Computerized Sentencing Information for Judges: An Aid to the 
Sentencing Process, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 54 (1987). 
185 CANADIAN SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING REFORM: A CANADIAN APPROACH 61 (1987). 
186 Anthony N. Doob & Norman W. Park, Computerized Sentencing Information for Judges: An Aid to the 
Sentencing Process, 30 CRIM. L. Q. 54, 55 (1987) (noting that 79% of judges responded that better 
information about past sentences would be helpful). 
187 Miller, supra note 181. 
188 Id. at 130. 
189 Id. (quoting Anthony Doob, Sentencing Aids: Final Report (1989) (unpublished manuscript)). 
190 Id. 
191 Neil Hutton, A Sentencing Exception? Changing Sentencing Policy in Scotland, 22 FED. SENT’G RPTR. 
272, 275 (2010). 
192 SENTENCING COMMISSION FOR SCOTLAND, supra note 182, at 36. 
193 Neil Hutton & C. Tata, Sentencing Reform by Self-Regulation: Present and Future Prospects of the 
Sentencing Information System for Scotland’s High Court Justiciary, 6 SCOTTISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 37, 44 
(2000). 
194 THE SENTENCING COMMISSION FOR SCOTLAND, THE SCOPE TO IMPROVE CONSISTENCY IN SENTENCING 
14 (2006). 
195 Id. at 37. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
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2010 one of the designers of the system proclaimed that the SIS is essentially non-
operational, having been “allowed to atrophy” following years of judicial neglect.198 
Australia boasts the world’s most successful SIS, at least measured by longevity.  
The Judicial Commission of New South Wales has maintained a searchable database of 
sentencing statistics since 1988.199  Strangely, in the 24 years of its operation, no effort 
has been undertaken to evaluate its effectiveness.  There is evidence that some judges in 
actually use the system by performing searches,200 but no research concerning its effects 
on sentencing outcomes. 
Over time, however, the New South Wales system has been relegated to a support 
role.  Beginning in 1998, the Supreme Court of New South Wales began to announce 
“guideline judgments,” which specified an advisory sentencing range for offenses.201  In 
2003, the New South Wales General Assembly enacted “standard non-parole sentencing 
periods”202—essentially a statutory determinate sentencing scheme203—that set 
presumptive sentences for many serious offenses.  Judges are now permitted to depart 
from the legislatively-prescribed sentence, but only upon finding facts justifying a 
departure.204  The General Assembly concluded that, despite the availability of the SIS, 
inter-judge sentencing disparity had reached unacceptable levels.  The primary reason for 
the new regime, according to its supporters, was to reduce that form of disparity.205 
Promising new SISs are underway around the world, and they may provide new 
insights on the information sharing model.  Ireland’s criminal courts launched a new, 
publicly accessible web-based SIS in 2010.206  Australia recently launched a nationwide 
SIS, modeled on the New South Wales system, for federal offenses prosecuted 
throughout the country.207  In the United States, Missouri has rolled out a web-based 
                                                 
198 Hutton, supra note 191, at 275.  
199 Miller, supra note 181, at 129, 133.  For a detailed description of the system’s origins and functionality, 
see Ivan Potas et al., Informing the Discretion : The Sentencing Information System of the Judicial 
Commission of New South Wales, 6 INT’L J. L. INFO. TECH. 99, 104-14 (1998)  
200 JUDICIAL COMM’N OF NEW SOUTH WALES, ANNUAL REPORT 2008–09, at 24 (2009) (showing some 
930,000 pages accessed by judicial officers from 2008 to 2009). 
201 See, e.g., R. v. Jurisic, 45 NSWLR 209, 229 (1998).  Such guideline judgments were “intended to be 
indicative only” and to preserve “flexibility” for sentencing judges, but reflected the Court’s concerns about 
“[i]nconsistency in sentencing,” which “offends the principle of equality before the law.”  Id.  
202 Arie Frieberg, Australia: Exercising Discretion in Sentencing Policy and Practice, 22 FED’L SENT’G R. 
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203 For a description of statutory determinate sentencing, see MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 10, 
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Wales indicates that presumptive non-parole sentences have succeeded in improving inter-judge 
consistency.  Id. at 59-60.  Some observers, however, have suggested that the real motivation was to pander 
to public criticism that sentences were too lenient.  Frieberg, supra note 202, at 207. 
206 Coulter, supra note 7, at 4. 
207 Wendy Kukulies-Smith, The Quest for Sentencing Consistency in the Federal System, Address Before 
the National Judicial College of Australia, Feb. 6-7, 2010, available at http:// 
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system for disseminating statistics and other sentencing information.208  And at least 
preliminary work has begun on SIS-type efforts in Israel and England and in state courts 
in Oregon.209  So far, however, those systems have not been the subject of careful 
research, and their future is uncertain. 
2.  Sentencing Councils 
The experience of “sentencing councils,” another sentencing reform effort 
grounded in the information sharing model, is also instructive.  Sentencing councils were 
groups of district judges, serving on the same court, who met regularly (typically once 
per week) to discuss upcoming sentencing decisions.210  Four federal district courts, in 
Brooklyn, Chicago, Detroit, and Oregon, experimented with sentencing councils in the 
1960s and 1970s.211  The councils functioned as roundtable discussions of upcoming 
cases.  In advance of the meeting, all participating judges, including the judge responsible 
for imposing sentence, would review the presentence report and other materials and make 
an initial recommendation about the appropriate sentence.  As a group, judges would then 
talk about the evidence, share their views about the most important facts and 
considerations, and try to persuade one another.212  Nancy Gertner has compared 
sentencing councils to clinical rounds performed by physicians.213 
The principal goal of sentencing councils was to reduce inter-judge disparity.214  
Sentencing councils provided the sentencing judge with detailed, case-specific 
information about how other judges would respond to each new set of facts.  Participating 
judges saw the work of sentencing councils as an “educational process” in which judges 
could “pool[] [their] knowledge and experience and learn[] from each other.”215  Sharing 
information about how other judges would handle the case, they predicted, “will likely 
have the effect of ameliorating the likelihood of sentence disparity.”216 
Consistent with the information sharing model, sentencing councils were 
voluntary in two ways.  First, the recommendations of other judges at the sentencing 
council were merely advisory.  The sentencing judge retained sole discretion to impose 
the final sentence.217  To goal was to assist, not to restrain: “No attempt is made at these 
Councils to impose the will of one upon another.”218  Second, in some districts, 
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participation in the sentencing council was itself optional, and not all judges elected to 
attend the meetings.219 
Participating judges raved.220  They found the discussions valuable, reporting that 
they frequently changed their views about the appropriate sentence in response to their 
colleagues’ advice.221  The discussions, by all accounts, were informal and friendly.  
Outside observers were uniformly impressed with the seriousness and care with which 
sentencing councils approached each case.222 
Yet two major research projects found that sentencing councils did not 
meaningfully reduce inter-judge sentencing disparity.223  Shari Diamond and Hans Zeisel 
studied the effects of sentencing councils in Brooklyn and Chicago by comparing 
sentencing judges’ initial recommendations with their final sentences.  They found strong 
evidence of inter-judge disparity in the initial recommendations, with judges apart on 
average by 36.7% in Chicago and 45.5% in Brooklyn.224  In their evaluation of cases, the 
data showed, “some judges are clearly more severe than others.”225  But sentencing 
councils alleviated only a small fraction of that disparity.  Diamond and Zeisel found that 
final sentences imposed, after full discussion with the sentencing council, remained apart 
on average by 35.4% in Chicago and 41.1% in Brooklyn.226  They estimated, therefore, 
that sentencing councils reduced inter-judge disparity by just 4% to 10%.227 
Another study, commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), examined the 
effects of sentencing councils in Detroit, Chicago, and Brooklyn.228  Focusing on five 
offense types, the FJC study compared levels of inter-judge disparity in the years before 
and after the establishment of the sentencing council.  The results were discouraging.229  
In every district, inter-judge disparity actually increased for some offenses, even as it 
decreased for others.230  Based on the mixed results, the study concluded that “councils 
may increase disparity as frequently as they decrease it.”231 
The experiment did not last.  By the mid-1980s, sentencing councils in the federal 
courts were abandoned. 
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3.  Lessons for the Information Sharing Model  
The experiences of SISs and sentencing councils highlight some of the 
fundamental weaknesses of the information sharing model.  Challenges in disseminating 
sentencing information have resulted in struggles, and even the collapse, of several SISs 
around the world.  Both reform efforts also have suffered from voluntariness problems, 
with sentencing courts too often disregarding, ignoring, or rejecting the available 
information. 
a.  Information Dissemination 
Strikingly, in jurisdictions in which SISs have struggled or even collapsed, the 
most frequently cited reasons have been practical difficulties with disseminating the 
information in a useful way.  No system can survive for long if its users—judges and 
their court staff—find it cumbersome, confusing, or unhelpful. 
Scotland’s SIS offers the clearest example.  Judges themselves proposed the 
development of the system, as a tool to improve inter-judge consistency and rationality.  
They understood that the success of the project depended on a collective effort, since 
every narrative description they wrote would be added to a searchable database available 
to their colleagues.  And they had strong practical incentives to make it work because the 
SIS was launched in part to short-circuit proposals for more intrusive reforms like 
sentencing guidelines.232  Yet in just a few years the system fell into disuse, with judges 
rarely searching for relevant information about past sentencing practice.233   
Complexity was one part of the problem.  Although the system’s designers 
worked with judges in selecting search parameters, and boasted about the system’s ease 
of use and flexibility, judges reported that they found the system’s search tools 
frustrating.234  As system designers around the world have acknowledged, an SIS cannot 
remain neutral with respect to the factors that are most relevant at sentencing.235  
Privileging some factors while excluding others inevitably discourages some users from 
accessing the available information. 
Volume was another.  In rolling out the Scottish SIS, system designers had to 
train judges never to enter more than a few parameters at once, because the system almost 
always returned too few cases.236  Other systems have encountered the opposite problem.  
Designers of a fledgling SIS in Israel declined to include “detailed descriptions” or even 
“summaries” of cases because, given the large number of results, “it was felt that judges 
would not take the time to read case descriptions.”237 
Those problems can compound one another.  Following the launch of the Scottish 
SIS, judges who found the system cumbersome and unhelpful did not always make time 
to enter detailed and accurate information about their sentences.238  Such shortcuts and 
errors made the system less useful, reinforcing other judges’ sense that the effort of 
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producing detailed opinions was a waste of time and energy.239  The result was a vicious 
cycle in which the system gradually atrophied and ultimately collapsed. 
Privacy concerns also have hampered the success of SISs.  With few exceptions, 
SISs have been made available only to judges and court personnel, with no access to 
defense counsel, prosecutors, or the public.240  In part, not to the judges’ credit, that kind 
of secrecy was designed to shield sentencing decisions from public scrutiny and 
criticism.241  But in part it also reflected legitimate concerns about disclosing deeply 
personal information about the lives of offenders, family members, and victims.242  In the 
handful of systems that are publicly accessible, privacy concerns do not arise either 
because the information is expressed entirely in the aggregate (as in Missouri), or because 
records are anonymous and little detailed case-specific information is available (as in 
Ireland). 
b.  Voluntariness 
The abandonment of sentencing councils and the struggles of SISs also undermine 
a key assumption of the information sharing model.  For information sharing to reduce 
inter-judge disparity and promote rationality, judges must respond to information about 
previous sentences in similar cases by conforming their decisions to those of their 
colleagues.   The history of these reform efforts makes clear that judges frequently 
respond differently, by disregarding the information, ignoring it entirely, or even shifting 
to a more extreme position. 
Researchers cited voluntariness as the principal reason that sentencing councils 
failed to meaningfully reduce inter-judge disparity.  Michael Tonry reasoned that 
sentencing councils had little effect because “[t]he council recommendations are only 
advisory,” leaving judges who disagree with their colleagues free to disregard the 
advice.243  The FJC study concurred, noting that it should come as no surprise that a 
strictly voluntary “self-reform” that preserved “broad discretion” for sentencing judges 
did not meaningfully affect sentencing outcomes.244  Surprisingly, even where judges 
consciously sought out the advice of their colleagues—in courts where participation in 
the sentencing council was optional—the effects on inter-judge disparity were 
negligible.245  As long as the sentencing judge had the final word, sentencing councils 
had little effect.246 
In addition, as the experiences of SISs and sentencing councils make clear, judges 
may decline to look up the information in the first place.  The Canadian SIS fell into 
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disuse because, in the words of the chief designer, “[j]udges do not, as a rule, care to 
know what sentences other judges are handing down in comparable cases.”247  
Particularly troubling is evidence that Canadian judges were especially unlikely to 
consult the SIS “if they knew (or thought) that these other judges have different 
approaches” than their own.248  That kind of reluctance prevents the information sharing 
model from reducing inter-judge disparity in precisely the category of cases where it 
holds the most promise.  Similarly, participation in sentencing councils was spotty when 
judges’ attendance was optional.  In the Northern District of Illinois, five of the court’s 
14 judges regularly participated in the sentencing council, bringing more than 60% of 
their cases before the sentencing council.249 But six of the court’s judges elected never to 
participate, and three others participated only occasionally, bringing less than 50% of 
their cases before the council.250  The result was that only one-third of criminal sentences 
benefited from the council’s advice.251  Some judges resisted the procedure on the ground 
that it would intrude upon their independent judgment at sentencing, and that it would be 
a “waste of time.”252 
Experience with SISs also point to the risk of confirmation bias when consulting a 
large body of sentencing information.  Consider the operation of the New South Wales 
system.  Judges can enter a few search parameters and generate a histogram that shows a 
distribution of prior sentences.253   For example, for offenders (1) under the age of 21, 
who (2) plead guilty, (3) to driving while intoxicated, the SIS may report that 29% of 
offenders received probationary sentences, 24% received sentences of imprisonment, 
21% received intermediate sentences, and 15% received compound sentences.254  In 
theory, judges could review the written opinions in each of the approximately 120 cases 
summarized in the chart, attentive to factors that may be present in a new case that fits 
those criteria.  Equally likely, however, given the volume of matching cases and limited 
time, judges could focus on cases that confirm the result they already have in mind. 
Attitude polarization is also a risk, according to the research.  The FJC study of 
sentencing councils found troubling evidence that, at least for some offenses, the 
introduction of the councils coincided with an increase in inter-judge disparity.255  The 
study speculated that when judges at a sentencing council “meet, for the first time, 
opposition to their ideas” about sentencing, the experience “may result in movement to a 
more extreme position.”256  Alternatively, judges with more extreme views “may 
convince moderate judges to follow their more lenient or harsh sentencing patterns.”257  
Better information about other judges’ actions, in other words, did not necessarily bring 
                                                 
247 Miller, supra note 181, at 130 (quoting Anthony Doob, Sentencing Aids: Final Report (1989) 
(unpublished manuscript)). 
248 Id. 
249 See Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 211, at 139-40 & Table 22. 
250 See id. 
251 Id. at 142-43. 
252 Committee on the Federal Courts, supra note 216, at 881-82 (describing Judge Marvin Frankel’s 
hypothesis about the degree of resistance revealed by polls of federal judges). 
253 See Potas et al., supra note 199, at 119.  
254 Id. (showing an actual report from the New South Wales SIS with similar results). 
255 See PHILLIPS, supra note 228, at 86-95. 
256 Id. at 94.  
257 Id. 
 42 
about consensus and greater inter-judge consistency.  It sometimes had the opposite 
effect, serving as a “catalyst[] for the airing of latent disagreements.”258 
The research thus undermines a key assumption of the information sharing model.  
As Marc Miller has observed, the power of sentencing information to reduce inter-judge 
disparity “depends on how judges use the information . . . to guide their own sentencing 
judgments.”259  The experiences of SISs and sentencing councils show that judges do not 
necessarily respond to better information in ways that promote inter-judge consistency 
and rationality. 
IV.   MAKING INFORMATION SHARING WORK 
Based on new and existing research, there is ample reason for skepticism about 
the information sharing model.  Fundamental weaknesses related to the collection, 
dissemination, and voluntariness of sentencing information make information sharing 
highly unattractive as an alternative to other structured sentencing models.   
Yet there is also reason for optimism.  Information sharing at sentencing may yet 
perform a valuable function as a supplement to other reforms.  Despite the mixed track 
record of previous experiments, it is entirely possible that information sharing can 
contribute to inter-judge consistency and rationality under the right conditions.  In 
particular, two features of a sentencing system that can improve the effectiveness of 
information sharing: (1) a system of sentencing guidelines, whether advisory or 
mandatory; and (2) open access to the store of sentencing information for defense counsel 
and prosecutors.  Each of those features, the preceding discussion suggests, helps to 
address key weaknesses of the information sharing model. 
A.   Sentencing Guidelines 
In light of its weaknesses, best way to implement the information sharing model 
may be as an adjunct to a system of sentencing guidelines.  As explained above, under a 
typical set of sentencing guidelines, the judge must make a series of factual 
determinations about the offense and offender.  Based on those facts, the guidelines 
specify a sentence or a sentencing range.  Depending on the jurisdiction, that range may 
be binding in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, or it may be merely 
advisory.260  A set of sentencing guidelines, whether mandatory or advisory, can make 
information sharing more effective in promoting inter-judge consistency and rationality.  
That is because guidelines perform several functions—defining terms, operationalizing 
complex factors, and channeling the attention of sentencing courts—that make 
information sharing easier.   
First, sentencing guidelines define terms and create a shared vocabulary for 
discussions of sentencing.  As Marc Miller has explained, sentencing guidelines “create a 
language of familiar terms and concepts” among sentencing judges, and that kind of 
“social language” makes it easier for sentencing judges to understand one another.261  
Guideline systems may define and popularize terms of art like “vulnerable victim,” 
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“substantial assistance,” or “role in the offense,” for example, that offer sentencing 
judges a succinct way of describing otherwise imprecise categories and concepts.262 
Second, systems of sentencing guidelines “operationalize” complex sentencing 
factors like criminal history.  Calculating a guideline sentencing range may depend, for 
example, on whether the offender has a previous criminal record.  Or it may depend on 
the number of prior convictions, or the seriousness of those convictions.  Or it may 
depend on an elaborate scoring system that awards more “criminal history points” for 
some kinds of offenses (e.g. felonies or violent crimes) than for others (e.g. juvenile 
offenses or older convictions).263  In the same manner, guidelines systems operationalize 
a whole host of other factors, such as the offender’s mental state, role in the offense, and 
the harm caused to victims.  It does not matter, for information sharing purposes, whether 
the guidelines consider factors in a sensible or principled way.  Simply by choosing one 
method of taking those factors into account, a system of guidelines sets a useful baseline. 
Third, sentencing guidelines channel the court’s attention to a standard set of facts 
and considerations.  Some systems, like the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, attempt to 
account for a dizzying number of factors, forcing judges to engage in extensive and 
intricate factfinding.264  Other systems are much simpler, taking into account fewer facts 
and circumstances and making more general recommendations.  But all guidelines 
systems focus the court’s attention on some set of especially salient offense and offender 
information.  Even if the guideline sentencing range is advisory, the process of 
determining that range is important. 
Those basic functions of a guidelines system help to address some of the major 
weaknesses of the information sharing model.  One set of challenges relates to the 
collection of sentencing information.  The complexity and volume of sentencing 
decisions makes it difficult to collect written, comprehensive, and representative 
sentencing information.265  By channeling the efforts of sentencing courts, and requiring 
that the judge always address some standard set of questions, sentencing guidelines 
ensure the availability of a basic level of information about every case.  That minimum 
level of information reduces (although it certainly does not eliminate) the risk that non-
comprehensive information might mislead future sentencing courts and thereby generate 
inter-judge disparity.  Guidelines also guard against a skewed and non-representative 
pool of cases because the standard set of findings is required from all judges and in all 
kinds of cases.  It is also possible that routinely answering a standard set of questions 
may also change sentencing judges’ habits in a way that encourages more written 
opinions, although overly complex guidelines may have the opposite effect. 
Sentencing guidelines also help to address challenges with the dissemination of 
sentencing information.266  By operationalizing important sentencing factors, sentencing 
guidelines provide a baseline set of categories and concepts that judges can use when 
searching for similar and relevant cases.   In addition, by supplying a common vocabulary 
among sentencing judges, guidelines can make search results easier to understand, reduce 
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errors based on inconsistent terminology, and generally reduce the risk of user frustration.  
Of course, a sentencing information system need not simply replicate the categories and 
concepts developed in the guidelines.267  Still, a framework of sentencing guidelines, 
with its shared language and baseline understanding of key factors, improves the chances 
that judges can use the information effectively. 
Admittedly, to date no research has established that information sharing can 
reduce inter-judge disparity or promote rationality.  At the same time, however, the 
experiences of SISs and sentencing councils do not foreclose the possibility of successful 
information sharing within a system of sentencing guidelines.  In each of the jurisdictions 
where SISs have failed, they were “stand-alone” systems in which judges received little 
guidance about sentencing.268  Similarly, sentencing councils operated in a pre-reform era 
in federal court, with little external guidance for sentencing judges.269  Perhaps it is no 
coincidence that the most successful information sharing experiments, such as the SIS 
developed in New South Wales, have survived alongside other forms of structured 
sentencing like guideline judgments and standard non-parole periods.270  Because of the 
basic functions they perform, a system of sentencing guidelines likely would improve the 
chances that information sharing can succeed. 
B.   Open Access 
Another way to improve the information sharing model is to publicize the store of 
sentencing information.  The body of written opinions and statistical information, along 
with any specialized search tools, could be made available to defense counsel and 
prosecutors—not just the court.  Publicly sharing information about sentencing would 
have obvious benefits for the criminal justice system as a whole.271  But open access 
would be of particular value in overcoming challenges related to voluntariness and the 
dissemination of sentencing information. 
As discussed above, one major obstacle to effective information sharing at 
sentencing is time.  Sentencing judges cannot afford routinely to sift through mountains 
of information about previous cases to ensure that their decisions are compatible with 
those of their colleagues.  The experiences of sentencing councils and SISs reveal when 
judges decline to consult available information, they frequently cite time constraints as a 
primary reason.  The complexity and volume of sentencing decisions, which make it 
difficult to design user-friendly search tools, can compound the problem by making 
judges less inclined to track down relevant cases. 
Open access would ease the burden on judges by transferring much of the case-
matching legwork to the lawyers.  In their briefs and at sentencing hearing, the parties 
could take the lead in identifying potentially relevant cases.  That would reduce the risk 
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of errors in identifying relevant cases, thereby promoting inter-judge consistency.272 
Although open access would mean more work for counsel, there is reason to think that 
lawyers would avail themselves of the information.  A store of information about 
previous sentences would be one more weapon in counsel’s arsenal in preparation for 
sentencing.  As an example, a decade ago, the Office of the Federal Public Defender in 
the District of Massachusetts began compiling a publicly available collection of 
downward departure decisions, sorted by offense type and judge, as a way to improve 
advocacy on behalf of criminal defendants.273   
At the same time, open access would increase the likelihood that the court will 
take the information seriously.  At sentencing, as in other contexts, judges make a point 
of responding to the specific contentions raised by the parties.  Although the information 
sharing model by design does not compel judges to give weight to any particular factors 
at sentencing, even judges who would not independently seek out information about 
previous sentences might respond to a well-formed argument by the prosecutor or 
defense counsel. 
In addition, open access could promote rationality by improving the quality of the 
judge’s reasoning.  Vigorous advocacy is a great asset to a sentencing court.  The parties 
can draw parallels between cases, debate possible points of distinction, and urge the 
judge to accept or reject the reasoning of their colleagues.  It is possible, of course, that 
the parties might use the store of sentencing information to stake out extreme positions 
that provide little help to the court.274  Yet adversarial testing of those arguments in 
principle should help judges to reach more thoughtful and principled outcomes. 
The major drawback to open access is the privacy of sentencing information.  
Written opinions and other sentencing documents may disclose deeply personal 
information about offenders, victims, family members, and witnesses.  For offenders and 
witnesses who cooperate with the government, open access might even create a risk of 
violent retaliation.275 
It may be possible to ameliorate those privacy concerns by partially withholding 
or redacting sensitive information made available to others.276  But too much redaction 
could defeat the purpose, undermining the effectiveness of the information sharing 
model.  Because personal information often plays a critical role in sentencing outcomes, 
concealing that information may render written opinions unhelpful, or even 
incomprehensible, to future judges and lawyers.   
Although there is no easy way of determining how to withhold or redact 
information, two strategies might prove useful.  First, because most sentencing 
information does not raise serious privacy concerns, case information could be presumed 
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accessible unless the parties or the court request that it be sealed.  Defense attorneys and 
prosecutors would have incentives not to overuse that power, since they stand to benefit 
from more complete information in future cases.  Second, the system could be designed 
to withhold private information only from the parties, while allowing judges access to 
complete information.  That way, even if counsel does not fully understand the facts and 
reasoning of a previous decision, the sentencing judge can take them into account. 
Neither a system of sentencing guidelines nor open access to sentencing 
information can guarantee the success of the information sharing model.  Its fundamental 
weaknesses, along with the poor track record of previous reform efforts, provide ample 
reason for skepticism.  Yet sentencing guidelines and open access would help to address 
challenges related to the collection, dissemination, and voluntariness of sentencing 
information.  They give the information sharing model its best chance to succeed. 
CONCLUSION 
The information sharing model is often advertised as a method of reducing inter-
judge disparity and promoting rationality in sentencing law.  The argument is that by 
assembling a body of written opinions and other information about past sentences, judges 
can align their sentences with those of their colleagues.   
This Article has identified three fundamental weaknesses in that model.  First, 
there are daunting information collection challenges.  Because of the complexity and 
volume of sentencing decisions, it is difficult for courts to generate sentencing 
information that is written, comprehensive, and representative.  Second, there are 
challenges in disseminating sentencing information in a useful way.  Privacy interests on 
the part of offenders and others raise serious concerns.  In addition, as a practical matter, 
it is difficult to make the large volume of relevant information available to judges in a 
useful format.  Third, the voluntariness of the information sharing model is an important 
drawback.  Judges retain the discretion to ignore or reject colleagues’ reasoning, 
undermining inter-judge consistency and rationality. 
New and existing research reinforces each of those weaknesses.  The Article 
contains an original study of information-collection practices in the only federal court 
that makes key sentencing documents public.  It finds that, despite mandatory reporting 
requirements, the court rarely provides the kind of written explanation needed to support 
the information sharing model.  The history of two other reform efforts, sentencing 
information systems and sentencing councils, reveals how voluntariness and challenges 
with information dissemination can frustrate information sharing at sentencing. As the 
FJC study of sentencing councils concluded, history is discouraging for “those who see 
disparity as a problem that can be solved by better communication among judges.”277   
More than anything, this “skeptic’s guide” makes a plea for realism about what 
the information sharing model can accomplish.  But information sharing at sentencing is 
in its infancy, and the claim here is therefore modest.  There is reason for skepticism that 
information sharing can serve as an alternative to other structured sentencing reforms 
aimed at improving inter-judge consistency and rationality.  But information sharing has 
real potential as a supplement to other efforts.  In particular, its odds of success would 
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greatly improve if implemented as part of a system of sentencing guidelines, and with 
open access to the information for defense counsel and prosecutors.   
 48 
APPENDIX 
This Appendix provides additional details concerning case selection and coding 
for the empirical study, along with detailed regression results. 
A.   Case Selection 
The study examines Statement of Reasons documents (SORs) for sentences 
imposed in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts in fiscal year 
2006, which runs from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006.  As noted above, the 
District of Massachusetts is the only federal district court that makes the documents 
public, by posting them on the PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) 
system as part of the case docket.278 
The SORs were collected as part of a related study of inter-judge sentencing 
disparity, and the Technical Appendix to that article provides background information.279  
PACER supports case searches by filing date and closing date, but not by the date of 
sentencing.280  To identify cases that may include a sentence imposed in fiscal year 2006, 
the initial search extended to every criminal case filed in the district between January 1, 
2000, and June 30, 2006.281  The vast majority of results, including dismissals, 
jurisdictional transfers, and acquittals, were ignored because they did not produce a 
sentence during the relevant period. 
The result was a body of 411 SORs for sentences imposed in fiscal year 2006.  
The Sentencing Commission reports that the district as a whole submitted documentation 
for 512 sentences that year.282  The SORs examined here therefore represent 80.3% of the 
total.  There are several possible explanations for the missing SORs.  First, although the 
District of Massachusetts generally makes SORs available on PACER, in some cases the 
SOR is unavailable, or the docket indicates that the SOR is sealed.  Judges retain the 
power to seal the SOR for case-specific reasons, such as the protection of offenders or 
witnesses who have cooperated with the government.283  Second, cases filed before 2000 
with a sentence in 2006—for example, cases extended by appeal and remand or complex 
conspiracy cases with many defendants—would have escaped the initial search.  Thus, 
although the available set of 411 documents includes more than 80% of the total, it is not 
complete.   
Nor are the available SORs necessarily a random sample of the total.  It is 
possible that SORs that do not appear on PACER differ in important ways, such as the 
level of written explanation provided, from the SORs that are available.  Fortunately, as 
Table A1 indicates, the SORs available on PACER differ only slightly from the total 
population of SORs submitted to the Commission: 
                                                 
278 See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text. 
279 See Scott, supra note 14, at 54-55. 
280 The date of sentencing rarely matches the closing date because of multiple-defendant cases, appeals, 
supervised release hearings, and other postsentence filings.  
281 PACER’s “Reports” tool allows searches by “Case Type,” including criminal cases.  The search 
included pending and terminated defendants, but excluded cases involving fugitive defendants. 
282 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK FOR SENTENCING STATISTICS 2006, Table 1 (2006) 
(reporting a total of 512 Statements of Reasons received from the District of Massachusetts). 
283 United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 278 n.66 (D. Mass. 2004) (Young, C.J.) (citing Minutes of 
the Court Meeting (D. Mass.), Sept. 4, 2001, at 4). 
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Table A1:  Comparison of All SORs and Available SORs 
District of Massachusetts, FY 2006284 
 
 All SORs 
FY 2006 
Available on 
PACER 
Total Cases 512 411 
Imprisonment Ordered 87.6% 81.8% 
Average Prison Sentence 73.0 months 78.1 months 
Within Guideline Range 74.1% 67.4% 
Below Guideline Range 24.8% 29.7% 
Above Guideline Range 1.2% 2.9% 
 
Although modest, potential differences between the available SORs on PACER and the 
full pool of SORs submitted to the Commission are a reason for caution. 
B.   Coding 
To measure the level of written explanation contained in each SOR, a research 
assistant counted the total number of sentences of text provided.  The count included 
written explanations from all three of the SOR form’s narrative description fields.  It also 
included written explanations contained in any attachments, such as published sentencing 
opinions and hearing transcripts.  In those cases, however, the count included only 
portions of the opinion or proceeding in which the judge provided reasons for the 
sentence imposed.  It excluded, for example, discussion of guideline calculations, 
constitutional challenges, and procedural matters.   
In some cases, the SOR contains only a generic statement with no discussion of 
the particular offense or offender.  As an example, some SORs state: “I have considered 
the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and I have imposed a sentence sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary, to achieve those purposes.”285  Because generic statements of that kind 
merely restate the judge’s task, without providing any explanation of the sentence 
imposed, they were coded as zero sentences of explanatory text. 
In addition, SOR forms were coded for whether any checkboxes were marked to 
explain the sentence.  The “checkbox” condition was considered satisfied if any 
checkbox was marked in any section of the SOR form that lists reasons for the sentence.  
Checkboxes unrelated to the reasons for the sentence, such as those describing whether a 
fine was imposed or the presentence report was adopted, did not satisfy the checkbox 
condition. 
The study reports the results of two logistic regression models, each based on a 
different dependent variable.  Logistic regression was necessary because both dependent 
variables are binary rather than normally distributed.  The first is whether the SOR 
contains any written explanation of the sentence.  If the SOR contains zero sentences of 
explanatory text, then the dependent variable is coded as zero.  If the SOR contains one 
                                                 
284 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl. MA-
06 (2006). 
285 The statement closely tracks 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), which sets out factors that a judge must consider at 
sentencing. 
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or more sentences of explanatory text, then the dependent variable is coded as one.  A 
mark in a checkbox was not coded as a form of written explanation. 
The second is whether the SOR contains a “long” written explanation, consisting 
of at least 10 sentences of text.  That cutoff corresponds to roughly one page of narrative 
description, and was considered a reasonable proxy for the kind of explanation sufficient 
to provide meaningful information about the reasons for the sentence to another judge.  If 
the SOR contains 10 or more sentences of explanatory text, then the dependent variable is 
coded as one.  If the SOR contains fewer than nine sentences, then the dependent variable 
is coded as zero. 
Both models include the following independent variables: 
(1) Sentence length, in months.  Sentence length is coded as length of the term of 
imprisonment, measured in months.  Consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s 
practice, sentences of probation were coded as zero months of imprisonment.286   
(2) Non-guideline sentence, an indicator.  Non-guideline sentences include 
sentences above or below the guideline sentencing range, whether styled as a “departure,” 
a post-Booker “variance,” or using another term.  Following the Commission’s 
conventions, government-sponsored below-range sentences were coded as within range. 
(3) Within-range sentences of more than 24 months, an indicator.  This dummy 
variable was coded because the SOR form requires a written narrative explanation for 
that category of sentences, but not for other within-range sentences. 
(4) Sentence of time served, and indicator.  Sentences of “time served” present 
special challenges.  In the federal system, offenders may receive credit for time served in 
official detention prior to sentencing.287  It is common for a judge to impose a sentence of 
time served, allowing the offender to be released immediately.  The sentence is not zero 
months of imprisonment because the offender is credited by statute for serving time.  But 
SOR forms sometimes list the sentence simply as “time served,” with no indication of the 
length of presentence detention for which the offender has been credited.  Lacking more 
precise information, sentences of time served were coded as zero months of 
imprisonment, but an additional dummy indicator was added to permit analysis of those 
cases. 
In addition, one model uses dummy variables that capture the identity of the 
sentencing judge.  To avoid the distorting effects of judges with low caseloads, such as 
those in senior status, those models exclude sentences by judges with fewer than 15 
sentences during the fiscal year.288  Following standard practice for categorical variables, 
one judge was omitted as a reference category.  The second model, based on long 
explanations, does not include judge dummy variables because too many judges 
submitted no long explanations during the year of the study.  
C.   Regression Results 
The first model describes factors that predict whether the Statement of Reasons 
contains any written explanation.  Table 1 reports the results: 
                                                 
286 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 62 (same convention). 
287 See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). 
288 Cf. James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 288 (1999) (limiting analysis of inter-judge disparity to 
judges who imposed at least 30 cases in a two-year period). 
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Table 1:  Logistic Regression Model 
Written Explanation Provided 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Significance 
(Constant) -1.153 0.676 .088 
Sentence Length 0.007 0.002 .001* 
Sentence of Time Served 0.409 0.900 .649 
Non-Guideline Sentence 3.320 0.392 <.001* 
Within-Range Over 24 Months 0.719 0.579 .214 
Judge Identity (categorical)   .001* 
 
Model significance: <.001*    * Significant at the .05 level 
Chi-square: 183.866                n = 398 
 
The model indicates that some kinds of sentences are more likely to produce a written 
explanation than others.  Non-guideline sentences, longer terms of imprisonment, and the 
identity of the judge are significantly correlated with written explanations.  A within-
range sentence of more than 24 months, however, is not a significant predictor of a 
written explanation, after controlling for other factors.  That casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of SOR form’s instructions, which require a written explanation in those 
circumstances. 
The second model describes factors that predict whether the Statement of Reasons 
contains a long written explanation of 10 or more sentences.  Table 2 reports the results: 
 
Table 2:  Logistic Regression Model 
Long Explanation (10+ sentences) Provided 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Significance 
(Constant) -4.495 1.006 <.001* 
Sentence Length -0.003 0.004 .482 
Non-Guideline Sentence 1.086 0.519 .037* 
Within-Range Over 24 Months 1.338 1.124 .234 
 
Model significance: <.001*    * Significant at the .05 level 
Chi-square: 11.185                n = 408 
 
Non-guideline sentences are significantly correlated with long explanations.  Neither 
sentence length nor within-range sentences above 24 months, however, is a statistically 
significant predictor of a long explanation. 
 
